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DO NONPARTISAN, PUBLICLY FINANCED
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS ENHANCE
RELATIVE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE?*
JUDGE ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR.**
Twenty-one states elect appellate judges, while the others use
gubernatorial appointment, legislative elections, or merit
selection plans.1 In 1996, North Carolina changed its superior
court elections from partisan to nonpartisan elections.2 Partisan
elections for district court judges were later eliminated in 2001 in
lieu of nonpartisan elections.3 By 2004, North Carolina made the
same switch to nonpartisan elections for appellate judge seats,
along with a voluntary public campaign financing system for
appellate judges.4 This Article compares judicial elections before
and after the adoption of a nonpartisan, publicly funded election
system and concludes that, while public financing was widely
utilized by candidates and equalized funding, these changes have
only marginally achieved their goals of reducing the influence of
outside money, promoting public interest in judicial elections,
and enhancing relative judicial independence. This Article also
argues that any system short of selection with tenure during good
behavior will compromise judicial independence.

* © 2015 Judge Robert N. Hunter, Jr.
** Judge Robert N. Hunter, Jr. is a former Justice of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina and presently a Judge at the North Carolina Court of Appeals. He received his
Juris Doctor in 1973 from the University of North Carolina School of Law and his L.L.M.
in 2014 from Duke Law School. This Article is a revision of the thesis submitted for his
L.L.M. degree. Thanks to my law clerk Molly Martinson for her excellent research
assistance.
1. See DIV. OF PUB. EDUC., AM. BAR ASS’N, Judicial Selection Methods—An
Overview, in 2003 LAW DAY PLANNING GUIDE 29 (2003), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/lawday/schools/lessons
/pdfs/judicialhandout3a.pdf.
2. See Act of Aug. 2, 1996 ch. 9, § 7, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess. 536, 541–47
(codified as amended in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163).
3. See Act of Sept. 6, 2001, ch. 403, sec. 1, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 1548, 1548–49
(codified as amended in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163).
4. See Act of Oct. 10, 2002, ch. 509, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 615, 616–23 (repealed 2013)
(establishing a public campaign financing fund); 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws at 626 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163 (2014)) (providing for
nonpartisan elections of appellate judges to begin in the 2004 election).
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INTRODUCTION
In his account of the rise of judicial elections in the United
States, J. H. Shugerman chronicles the spread of elections as a means
of selecting judges in state courts.5 His history narrates how the

5. See generally JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS:
PURSUING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA (2012) (describing how events in the
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founders’ vision for appointment of completely independent judges
secured by tenure during good behavior was replaced in some states
by judicial elections with fixed term limits, creating a less independent
judiciary, but providing for accountability to the people.6 Shugerman
measures this cost to judicial independence in two metrics:
Judicial independence has different meanings, but at its
core, it refers to a judge’s insulation from the political and
personal consequences of his or her legal decisions. This
historical account contrasts relative judicial independence
(independence from whom?) with general judicial
independence (how much independence from political pressure
generally?). Some reforms foster “general” judicial
independence: most importantly, length of tenure and job
security, but also protection of jurisdiction, salary, and other
resources. General independence does not mean absolute
autonomy; a judge might still be influenced informally by public
opinion, elite opinion, reputation, and ambitions for promotion.
General independence simply means a judge is more insulated
from direct political pressure from any source. By contrast,
reforms in methods of judicial selection produce relative
judicial independence. In the switch from one form of selection
to another, judges become more independent from one set of
powers but more accountable to another. The principal-agent
problem is one key to understanding the history of judicial
elections. Judicial appointments gave presidents, governors,
and legislators (the agents) control over the courts instead of
giving that power to the people (the principals). Many critics
argued that short-term appointments made the judges agents of
the agents, not agents of the people.7
Shugerman theorizes that no perfect model exists when it comes
to selecting judges.8 The concepts of judicial independence and
judicial accountability are contextual and change over time.9 Recent
academic discussions illustrate this debate. In the summer of 1998,
Duke University held a symposium on judicial independence.10 In
early 1800s led to the dramatic increase in the number of states using popular elections for
judges in the 1840s and 1850s).
6. See id. at 57.
7. Id. at 7.
8. See id. at 12.
9. See id. at 5–7.
10. See generally Symposium, Judicial Independence and Accountability, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol61
/iss3/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (examining various aspects of judicial independence,
discipline, and accountability).
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that symposium, Professor Paul Carrington suggested the following
explanation for the crisis between independence and accountability:
[It] may have been caused by the failure of some of the highest
state courts to keep faith with democratic traditions. We have
experienced an age of judicial heroism; during that time, judges
were encouraged to exercise their powers in disregard of
legislative prerogatives. As a consequence, many high courts
are highly visible objects of political interest and concern.11
Shugerman notes “the story of judicial elections is also the story of
the ongoing American pursuit of judicial independence—and the
changing understandings of what judicial independence means.”12
These changing understandings reflect the political energies
placed on the judicial branch by the other coordinate branches of
government through changes in court structure and by the people
through elections. By examining the changes in judicial structure and
elections and their effect on relative and general independence, one
can determine the value a state puts on judicial independence.
Using Shugerman’s metrics of structural and relative judicial
independence, this Article describes the ongoing pursuit of judicial
independence and the changing understandings of what judicial
independence means in North Carolina. Part I begins by describing
the historical conditions that shaped North Carolina’s judicial system
from the colonial period until 1990. Next, Part II examines the
political and legal changes that led the legislature to adopt a
nonpartisan, publicly financed system in 2002. Part III examines the
success of the nonpartisan, publicly financed system in enhancing
relative judicial independence by reducing the influence of outside
money and promoting public education and participation in judicial
contests.13 Finally, Part IV examines some of the notable failures of
the nonpartisan, publicly financed system and the causes of these
failures.
11. Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in
Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 79, 79–80.
12. SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 5.
13. In 2013, Republicans controlled both the general assembly and the Governor’s
office for the first time in over a century. See Kim Severson, G.O.P.’s Full Control in
Long-Moderate North Carolina May Leave Lasting Stamp, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/us/politics/gop-to-take-control-in-long-moderatenorth-carolina.html. The general assembly then abolished publicly financed elections. See
VIVA/Election Reform, § 38.1(a), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381, 1549. North Carolina now
has a system of privately financed nonpartisan elections. Id. Because 2014 is the first year
in which such a system will be used, this change is only discussed in the postscript because
there is insufficient empirical data on which to base any conclusions.
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I. HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM PRIOR TO
1986
Part I analyzes the development of North Carolina’s judicial
system before 1990. This Part is divided into four time periods based
on major historical events affecting the judicial system: (a) the
antebellum period, prior to 1867; (b) the Reconstruction Act era,
from 1867–1900; (c) the “solid south” period, from 1900–1964; and (d)
the Voting Rights Act era, from 1964–1986.
The history of judicial independence in this state illustrates the
interplay between the branches of state government and how judicial
independence expands and contracts over time depending on the
political climate.14 As the political climate changes, relative judicial
independence changes as well.15 This fluctuation or responsiveness is
natural to any governmental structure in a democracy and reveals the
context in which the value of judicial independence changes over
time.16
A. Antebellum Courts in North Carolina
In colonial times, North Carolina had a weak, largely ineffective
colonial judiciary appointed by the Lord’s Proprietors or the Crown.17
This structure politicized the courts by enforcing unpopular royal
mandates on a widely disbursed population.18 Because of this colonial
period experience, revolutionary-era framers created a constitution
that evidenced their strong distrust of executive power.19 This
constitution created the beginnings of our independent judiciary by
establishing independent judicial offices, but within a system designed

14. See McNollgast, Conditions for Judicial Independence, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 105, 108 (2006) (generally describing “judicial independence as an outcome that
emerges from strategic interactions among the judiciary, the legislature, and the
executive”).
15. See id. (“[J]udicial independence waxes and wanes with changes in the political
composition of our three branches of government.”).
16. See Lydia Brashear Tiede, Judicial Independence: Often Cited, Rarely Understood,
15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 129, 134–35 (2006).
17. 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2533, 2743–53 (Francis
Newton Thorpe ed., 1906) (citing CHARTER OF CAROLINA of 1663 (Mar. 24, 1663)).
18. See William E. Nelson, Politicizing the Courts and Undermining the Law: A Legal
History of Colonial North Carolina, 1660–1775, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2133, 2133, 2153–54
(2010).
19. John L. Sanders, A Brief History of the Constitutions of North Carolina, in NORTH
CAROLINA GOVERNMENT, 1585–1974, A NARRATIVE AND STATISTICAL HISTORY 795,
795 (John L. Cheney, Jr. ed., 1975).
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by the legislature.20 Following the American Revolution, the Fifth
Provisional North Carolina Congress adopted the constitution of
1776, which provided that “Judges of the Supreme Courts of Law and
Equity, [and] Judges of Admiralty” were to be appointed by joint
ballot of the legislature; to “hold their offices during good
behaviour”;21 to receive “adequate salaries during their continuance
in office”;22 and to “not be removed from office by the General
Assembly, unless for misbehaviour, absence, or inability.”23 These
provisions of the North Carolina Constitution of 1776 contained all
three of the central tenants of judicial independence: (1) a judiciary
separate from the other branches of government; (2) life terms for
judges during good behavior; and (3) adequate judicial salaries.24
These courts, created by the constitution of 1776, enhanced
judicial independence by first establishing constitutional judicial
review—the legal principal that the judicial branch is the final arbiter
of the constitution.25 Bayard v. Singleton26 established constitutional
judicial review in North Carolina sixteen years before Marbury v.
Madison27 established it at the federal level.28 After Bayard was
decided, the general assembly refused to grant to judges the salary
increases given to other state officials as punishment for voiding its
act.29
To prevent the legislature from using salary decreases as a
weapon, three additional provisions strengthening the structural
independence of the North Carolina judiciary were added to the
constitution in 1835.30 The first provision declared that judges’ salaries
shall not decrease during their continuance in office.31 The second and
third provisions mandated that judges may only be removed from
office either by impeachment or for “mental or physical inability,
20. Id.
21. N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIII.
22. Id. art. XXI.
23. Id. art. XXXIII.
24. See Scott D. Gerber, The Origins of an Independent Judiciary in North Carolina,
1663–1787, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1774 (2009).
25. Id. at 1816–18.
26. 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5 (1787) (refusing to enforce against the defendant a law that was
contrary to the North Carolina Constitution).
27. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
28. See John V. Orth, Thinking About Law Historically: Why Bother?, 70 N.C. L.
REV. 287, 291 (1991).
29. See Jeff Broadwater, Bayard v. Singleton, N.C. HIST. PROJECT, http://www
.northcarolinahistory.org/commentary/117/entry (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
30. See Walter F. Pratt, Jr., The Struggle for Judicial Independence in Antebellum
North Carolina: The Story of Two Judges, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 129, 131–32 (1986).
31. Id. at 131.
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upon a concurrent resolution of two-thirds of both branches of the
General Assembly.”32 These amendments were added at the request
of two of the three sitting justices of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, Justice Ruffin and Justice Gaston.33 After ratification of the
1835 constitution, North Carolina had achieved complete relative and
structural judicial independence because no judge could be removed
from office on the basis of politically unpopular decisions unless that
judge was formally impeached.
Regardless of the mechanisms intended to enhance judicial
independence, there is little likelihood of removal if the judiciary
exercises judicial restraint and does not declare any statutes
unconstitutional.34 As Shugerman contends, a measure of the vigor of
judicial independence is the frequency in which a supreme court will
use judicial review to overturn statutes.35 Thus by Shugerman’s
measure, judicial independence was only theoretical in the
antebellum period. For example, during the period in which judges
were appointed by the legislature in North Carolina from 1780 to
1859, the Supreme Court of North Carolina heard a total of 5,908
reported cases.36 But up until 1859, the supreme court only voided
thirteen statutes as unconstitutional.37
This result can be foreseen because of the structure of the court
in the antebellum period. At this time, nearly every judge on the
Supreme Court of North Carolina had a strong connection to the
general assembly; even Leonard Henderson, one of only two judges
selected to the court without service in the general assembly, had a
brother in the legislature at the time of his election.38 Thus, the low
32. Id. at 131–32.
33. SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 80–81.
34. Cf. William H. Pryor, Jr., Judicial Independence and the Lesson of History, 68
ALA. LAW. 389, 392 (2007) (“[T]he judiciary has a responsibility to safeguard its own
independence by being cautious about the exercise of its jurisdiction and power.”).
35. SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 124.
36. Id. at app. C.
37. Id. at app. B.
38. See Wm. H. Battle, Memoir of Leonard Henderson, 2 N.C. L.J. 197, 203 (1901);
U.S. Cong., Henderson, Archibald, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONG.,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=H000475 (last visited Aug. 17,
2015). These judges and their respective tenures are as follows: John Louis Taylor (1818–
1829); Leonard Henderson (1818–1833); John Hall (1818–1832); John D. Toomer (1829–
1829); Thomas Ruffin (1829–1852, 1858–1859); Joseph J. Daniel (1832–1848); William
Gaston (1833–1844); Frederick Nash (1844–1858); William H. Battle (1848–1848, 1852–
1865, 1866–1868); Richmond M. Pearson (1848–1865, 1866–1878); Matthias E. Manly
(1859–1865); Edwin Godwin Reade (1866–1879). Kemp P. Battle, Address on the History
of the Supreme Court (Feb. 4, 1889), in 103 N.C. 339, 378–79 (1889) [hereinafter Battle,
Address]. All were elected to the general assembly before or after ascending the bench,
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number of statutes overturned by the court is not surprising since a
sitting justice would be unlikely to rule as unconstitutional any
statutes that one helped to create.
In post-revolution America, judicial independence was still an
evolving concept.39 Three men were elected by the general assembly
as trial court judges: Samuel Ashe, Samuel Spencer, and James
Iredell.40 Iredell was subsequently replaced by John Williams.41 Until
1819, there was no established supreme court as we understand the
court today.42 Instead, from the revolution until 1818, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina consisted of a “Court of Conference,”
composed of trial court judges that served to hear appeals in a
method similar to en banc procedures used today.43 In 1818, when the
legislature passed a statute enabling a supreme court, it consisted of
three judges: a chief justice and two associate justices.44 But given life
tenure during good behavior and a three-judge court, it is not
surprising that during the fifty-year period from 1818 until 1868 only
twelve men were appointed by the legislature and served as justices of
the Supreme Court of North Carolina.45
Although Bayard established the ability of the judiciary to
withhold its enforcement of a statute on constitutional grounds,46
practical employment of this concept was rare.47 While Shugerman’s
measure suggests that the frequency with which a court overturns
decisions of the legislature reflects the health of judicial

except Leonard Henderson and John Hall. See WALTER CLARK, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 8–14 (1919).
39. See generally Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 108, 114–15 (1970) (describing various proposals for judicial
independence at the Constitutional Convention).
40. Battle, Address, supra note 38, at 354.
41. Id.
42. See CLARK, supra note 38, at 8; Pratt, supra note 30, at 134.
43. See Raymond B. Mallard, Inherent Power of the Courts of North Carolina, 10
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1974).
44. Act of Nov. 17, 1818, ch. 1, 1818 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, 3 (1818).
45. The 1868 constitution increased the number of justices to five. N.C. CONST. of
1868, art. IV, § 8. The 1875 amendments to the constitution reduced the number to three.
Id. amend. XII (1875). In 1888, the court was again increased to five members. JOHN V.
ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 18 (1993). Then
in 1937, the court was increased by statute to seven, its present size. Act of Feb. 3, 1937,
ch. 16, § 1, 1937 N.C. Sess. Laws 47, 47.
46. See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text.
47. See SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at app. D, at 281 (indicating that judicial review
by state courts was rare until the mid-1800s); supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
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independence,48 the heart of his theory is that once a judge secures
office, his opinions cannot cause his removal.49
If measured by this alternative standard, a measure of relative
independence, then this period of North Carolina history was a high
watermark of judicial independence. During this time in North
Carolina’s judicial history, only one petition for removal was
considered.50 Motivated by ill feelings of disappointed attorneys and
minority legislators, the petition was presented in 1786 and
considered by a joint legislative session.51 The judges were declared
innocent of the charges outlined in the petition, and the legislature
subsequently adopted a resolution praising the judges for their “long
and faithful services.”52 This result may not be surprising since the
legislature elected the judges and each judge was a member of the
majority party in the legislature at that time.53
The federal and state judicial systems during the antebellum
period were substantially identical.54 Modeled after royal courts in
which judges were appointed by the sovereign,55 the antebellum
courts were modified based upon the democratic ideals of John
Adams and Alexander Hamilton.56 From these ideals, an archetype
arose of what a judge should be and how a judge should be selected.
This archetype supposed an independent force whose sole duty was to
protect the constitutional rights of individuals and resolve conflicts
between other branches of government. In this context, a judge
should be like Plato’s philosopher-king or King Solomon displaying
practical wisdom in resolving common problems.57
This model for judges and judicial selection was predominant
from the American Revolution until the 1830s.58 States adopting a
constitution during this time followed the federal model by adopting a

48. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
49. See Tiede, supra note 16, at 143–44, 148–50 (discussing judicial tenure and the
ability of courts to take stances in opposition to the other branches of government as
theories of judicial independence).
50. See Edward B. Clark, The Discipline and Removal of Judges in North Carolina, 4
CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1981).
51. Id. at 5–8 & n.30.
52. Id. at 8 (citing 18 State Rec. 461).
53. Id. (citing 1 R. CONNOR, NORTH CAROLINA: REBUILDING AN ANCIENT
COMMONWEALTH 395–96 (1929)).
54. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 DUKE L.J.
1589, 1595–96 (2009).
55. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
56. See SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 18–23.
57. 1 Kings 3:16–28.
58. See Shepherd, supra note 54, at 1595–96.
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system of appointed judges.59 But, dissatisfaction with the federal
form reached a height during the Jacksonian era, culminating when
the United States Supreme Court, still led by Chief Justice John
Marshall, frustrated President Andrew Jackson’s Native American
policies in Georgia.60
This spurred a “reform” movement toward state election of
judges, which began after the Jacksonian era and addressed popular
frustration with the federal archetype.61 Starting in New York in 1846,
the reform movement spread as western states entered the Union and
“reconstructed” Southern states adopted new constitutions to meet
the requirements of the Reconstruction Acts.62 Despite this
movement away from the federal model, the archetype of the judge as
being above politics and having tenure during good behavior
remained systematically employed by a majority of states.63
B.

1867 to 1900: The Reconstruction Judiciary

The Reconstruction Acts of 1867 required the Southern states to
enact a new state constitution as a precondition to readmission to the
Union.64 These acts led North Carolina to call a constitutional
convention to draft a new social contract, providing the opportunity
to reconsider its method of selecting judges.65
Recently elected Republicans were in control of the 1868
convention with a majority of 107 delegates.66 Their political goal was
to implement an abolitionist strategy to empower a unionist and black
electorate, which Republicans assumed would favor their interests.67
This electoral advantage was due in part to the military registration of
electors, including at least 70,000 newly enfranchised AfricanAmerican voters, and a reduction in the number of ex-Confederate
voters.68 The convention was held from January to March in 1868.69
59. See id.
60. See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (holding that Georgia did
not have the authority to regulate commerce between its citizens and the Cherokee
Nation).
61. See Shepherd, supra note 54, at 1597.
62. SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 84–87, 149, 276–77.
63. Id. at 57–58.
64. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. CLIII, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429; Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. VI,
§ 5, 15 Stat. 2, 3.
65. See JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
NORTH-CAROLINA, AT ITS SESSION 1868, at 483, 486 (Joseph W. Holden ed., 1868).
66. WILLIAM S. POWELL, NORTH CAROLINA THROUGH FOUR CENTURIES 392
(1989).
67. See id. at 392–94.
68. Id. at 391–92.
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The Republican delegates did not favor a completely
independent judiciary because of their discomfort with the
unaccountable, life-tenured federal judiciary in the antebellum
period.70 In their view, the federal judiciary had been the key to
unpopular enforcement of the fugitive slave law in northern states, 71
where federal judges were the means to enforce the return of fugitive
slaves.72 The delegates were also intimately familiar with Dred Scott v.
Sandford,73 which prohibited African-Americans from obtaining
citizenship.74 During and after the Civil War, life-tenured Democrats
and Whigs, who were not friendly to the abolitionist cause, populated
the United States Supreme Court.75 In contrast, Republicans sought
state judges who would enforce a new political order in North
Carolina.76 This order would go further than recognition of “black
codes” granting freed blacks limited civil rights.77 Republicans desired
judges who would ensure full rights for former slaves and unionists.78
The drafters of the 1868 constitution must have been keenly aware
that these groups could become insular minorities in North Carolina
should the majority of rebelling native whites regain control.
The flavor of this debate over judicial independence is captured
in the minutes of the 1868 convention.79 The committee drafting the
69. Id. at 392.
70. See John V. Orth ed., Tuesday, February 11, 1868: The Day North Carolina Chose
Direct Election of Judges: A Transcript of the Debates from the 1868 Constitutional
Convention, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1825, 1842, 1848–50 (1992) (cataloging the delegates’ votes
against the election of judges by the general assembly, against the appointment of judges
by the governor, and for the election of judges by the people).
71. See, e.g., id. at 1846–47 & n.30 (describing how one Republican delegate used the
example of Chief Justice Taney, the author of Dred Scott, as an argument for popular
election and against life-tenured, appointed judges).
72. Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony of American Federalism: National
Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty in Slavery and in Freedom, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1015,
1035–36 (1997).
73. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
74. Id. at 412–13.
75. For example, during the constitutional debate, Del. S.S. Ashley specifically
referred to former Chief Justice Taney as an example of the result of the federal system of
selection:
Chief Justice Taney . . . outraged the whole country by his iniquitous decisions.
Even death itself would not take him for a long time, and if it had not been for the
great love of the Northern people for the Union, they would, on his account, have
burst asunder the bonds that held the Union together.
Orth, supra note 70, at 1847.
76. See POWELL, supra note 66, at 388.
77. See id. at 383, 388.
78. See id. at 388.
79. See Orth, supra note 70, at 1846–47.
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article of the constitution governing the judicial branch sought
instructions as to which of three methods of selecting judges the
convention would prefer: popular election, legislative appointment, or
gubernatorial appointment with senate confirmation. In sequential
votes, the delegates instructed the drafters of article IV of the 1868
constitution as follows: for popular election (enacted 56–34); for
legislative appointment (defeated 72–30); and for gubernatorial
appointment with senate confirmation (defeated 63–38).80 The
persuading argument appears to have been forwarded by A.W.
Tourgée, a Guilford County delegate, as follows:
Mr. [A.W.] TOURGÉE said he was a Republican by habit,
instinct and reason. The people were best able to govern
themselves, and he believed with Aristotle that in a Republic
was the greatest wisdom. If the people were competent [to]
choose officers to make and execute the laws, he held that they
were competent to choose officers to interpret the laws. He
would be untrue to the highest principles of free government if
he should ever be led to approve anything less than that.
The delegate just seated had admitted that the people were
competent to choose the makers of the law, and were the
people then incompetent to choose the interpreters of the law?
He held that the maker of the law was higher than the
interpreter. To his mind the whole principle was plain. Not only
have the people the virtue and intelligence to elect a part of
their officers, but the virtue and intelligence to select all. If
incompetent to choose one, they were incompetent to choose
all, for the principle applies to all offices.
Now as to the proposed remedy that the Governor appoint
and the Senate confirm he would simply reply by asking a
question. Are the people more corrupt than their
representatives? Are the people more easily bought than the
Governor? If the people are corrupt all the departments of
government are even more corrupt than they are.81

80. Id. at 1848–50.
81. Id. at 1839. Tourgée was subsequently elected a code commissioner and a superior
court judge. Robert N. Hunter, Jr., The Past as Prologue: Albion Tourgée and the North
Carolina Constitution, 5 ELON L. REV. 89, 99, 101–02 (2013). His prolific pen wrote roman
à clef accounts of his experiences as a judge in North Carolina in A Fool’s Errand and The
Invisible Empire, in which he recounts the difficulties experienced by a trial court judge
upholding the rights of freedmen in Reconstruction North Carolina, specifically the right
to serve on a jury, the right to give evidence, and the right to vote. Id. at 90–94. Tourgée
himself was the subject of death threats, and two of his close associates were assassinated.
See MARK ELLIOT, COLOR BLIND JUSTICE: ALBION TOURGÉE AND THE QUEST FOR
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Conservatives in the convention argued for retaining the former
system wherein judges were to be appointed by the governor, to
receive confirmation from the legislature, and to hold office during
good behavior.82 Nonetheless, the constitution of 1868 was ratified in
April by a vote of 93,086 to 74,016.83 At that same time, candidates for
elective offices created under the constitution also ran for election,84
and a new Republican governor, judiciary, and legislature were
elected.85 Ironically, had the Conservatives’ proposal been adopted,
Republican judges would have likely secured the future of the court
with life-tenured positions since nearly all Republican candidates won
both legislative and judicial races in 1868.86 However the Republican
majority desired to have a judiciary that was accountable to the
electorate.87
The convention of 1868 expanded the supreme court to five
members elected for eight-year terms.88 In the election of 1868,
former pro-Union Whigs—Chief Justice R.M. Pearson (an incumbent
jurist) and Judge Edwin Godwin Reade—were elected along with
three other Republicans—William B. Rodman, Robert P. Dick, and
Thomas Settle.89 From 1868 to 1879, every justice on the Supreme
Court of North Carolina was a Republican, with one exception.90 But
on January 1, 1879, Democratic candidates took control and remained
in control thereafter when the court was reduced to three justices.91
In the election of 1894, Republican David M. Furches was
elected to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.92 Robert M.
Douglas, a Republican, followed Furches in 1896.93 In 1896,
RACIAL EQUALITY FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO PLESSY V. FERGUSON 35–36, 156–57
(2008); see also OTTO H. OLSEN, CARPETBAGGER’S CRUSADE: THE LIFE OF ALBION
TOURGÉE 161–64 (1965) (describing the lynching of Wyatt Outlaw, a black Republican
leader, outside of Tourgée’s courthouse and the assassination by strangling and stabbing
of John “Chicken” Stephens).
82. See Orth, supra note 70, at 1837–38 (documenting commentary from Conservative
William B. Rodman, who noted at the convention of 1868 that “it was not intended for
[judges] to reflect the wishes of the people, but merely to administer that justice which the
State owes to every citizen”).
83. Sanders, supra note 19, at 796.
84. See JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION 19–21 (2011).
85. See POWELL, supra note 66, at 395.
86. See id.
87. See supra notes 70–77 and accompanying text.
88. See JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
NORTH-CAROLINA, AT ITS SESSION 1868, supra note 65, at 259–60, 263–64.
89. See Battle, Address, supra note 38, at 378–79.
90. See CLARK, supra note 38, at 628.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 23–24.
93. Id. at 24; Clark, supra note 50, at 12.
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Republican Daniel L. Russell was elected governor.94 At the time of
Russell’s election, there were three Democratic members of the
supreme court and two Republicans.95 In 1900, Democrat Charles B.
Aycock was elected governor.96 Before he could take office, however,
Justice Faircloth, the Democratic chief justice, died, and Russell
appointed Furches as chief justice and Charles A. Cook, a fellow
Republican, to take Furches’ vacant seat.97
Shortly thereafter, the court heard the case of White v. Worth98 in
which the court, by a four-to-one vote, mandated that the North
Carolina Treasurer pay in part the salary of the state shellfish
inspector (a Russell appointee whose post had been abolished by the
1899 general assembly) during the remainder of his term.99 Chief
Justice Furches wrote the opinion, joined by Justice Faircloth, and
Justice Douglas concurred. The court based its decision to demand
payment upon its view that the inspector’s right to compensation had
vested as a property right upon appointment by the Republican
governor, and that property right could not be abolished by a
subsequent legislature without just compensation.100 A political
controversy ensued.
Subsequently, the Democrat-controlled house of representatives
voted along party lines 62–33 for impeachment articles against Chief
Justice Furches and Justice Douglas for violation of their oath of
office.101 All but one of the members of the supreme court appeared
as witnesses and were questioned extensively about their court
conference.102 The implication was that the impeached Republican
justices were influenced by party politics, because the governor who
appointed the shellfish inspector was Republican.103 The prosecution

94. Sanders, supra note 19, at 423.
95. See Clark, supra note 50, at 13.
96. Sanders, supra note 19, at 432.
97. Clark, supra note 50, at 13.
98. 126 N.C. 570, 36 S.E. 132 (1900).
99. Id. at __, 36 S.E. at 136.
100. See id. at __, 36 S.E. at 135–36.
101. See Special to the New York Times, To Impeach Southern Judges, North Carolina
House Votes to Oust the Chief and Associate Justice from Office, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
1901, at 1.
102. See Clark, supra note 50, at 14 (“All of the members of the Supreme Court, except
the recently appointed Justice Cook, appeared as witnesses and they were questioned
extensively and in detail about what occurred during the court conferences relating to
White v. Ayer.”).
103. See White, 126 N.C. at 573, 36 S.E. at 132 (“[O]n the 23d day of February, 1897,
the plaintiff was duly appointed by the governor of North Carolina.”); North Carolina
Governor Daniel Lindsay Russell, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, http://www.nga.org/cms
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obtained a majority vote of the senate for removal but failed to reach
the required two-thirds.104 The impeachment effort was in part an
opportunity to remove two of the three sitting Republican justices. It
was unnecessary to impeach the third Republican justice—Justice
William Faircloth—because he died on December 29, 1900.105
This impeachment trial, unlike its predecessor in 1786,106 had
strong ramifications for the independence of the judiciary. Because of
the political context in which it was conducted, the trial marked a
rapid decline in relative judicial independence. This was in part due to
the era of disenfranchisement of black voters, which occurred in 1901
and had the effect of eliminating political competition in statewide
offices.107 Moreover, the legislative intrusion of the impeachment
process into the conferences of the supreme court could only have
had a chilling impact on the other judges when considering the
possibility of confronting the legislature.108
This impeachment was a small part of the Democratic Party’s
larger plan throughout the South during Reconstruction to remove
Republicans from office and eliminate any political competition. By
controlling the voting process through registration qualifications such
as literacy and grandfather clauses, the general assembly effectively
ended all political competition for statewide offices in North Carolina
until the mid-1970s.109 Democrats held every superior court judicial

/home/governors/past-governors-bios/page_north_carolina/col2-content/main-content-list
/title_russell_daniel.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
104. See Doug Clark, When N.C. Justices Were Impeached, HERALD SUN (Durham Aug.
23, 2013), http://www.heraldsun.com/opinion/guestcolumnists/x2042201068/When-N-Cjustices-were-impeached.
105. See POWELL, supra note 66, at 445.
106. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
107. POWELL, supra note 66, at 443–44.
108. See Clark, supra note 50, at 14.
109. POWELL, supra note 66, at 443; see also John V. Orth, North Carolina
Constitutional History, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1759, 1785–86 (1992) (“Undoubtedly, the most
important to succeed in those years was the first: the suffrage amendment of 1900, which
added a literacy test and a poll tax requirement for voting. . . . Copied from an earlier
scheme developed in Louisiana, the literacy test included a ‘grandfather clause’ to protect
illiterate white male voters: whether one was literate or not, he was entitled to vote if he or
a lineal ancestor—the amendment did not actually specify a ‘grandfather’—had been
qualified to vote on January 1, 1867, a date artfully chosen. . . . To take advantage of the
grandfather clause, illiterate white men had to register by December 1, 1908; white males
coming of age thereafter would have to pass the literacy test to qualify to
vote. . . . Although in 1915 the United States Supreme Court ruled grandfather clauses
unconstitutional, North Carolina’s had by then safely accomplished its mission. As later
described by Henry Groves Connor, one of the architects of the suffrage amendment:
‘With the qualification imposed by this amendment the political power of the State
practically passed to the white voters—certainly for the present generation.’ ” (citations
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seat from 1900 until Judge Howard Manning, Jr.’s appointment and
subsequent election in 1988.110
C.

1900 to 1964: The Solid South Period

The “Solid South” system is defined as the period in the political
history of the South lasting from the end of Reconstruction in 1877 to
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.111 During this time, the
Democratic Party elected the majority of federal, state, and local
officials.112 Leaders had a self-referential sense of noblesse oblige,
believing that those who have high social rank or wealth have a
responsibility to be generous to those of a lower social rank with less
wealth.113 Political scientist V.O. Key, writing in 1949, coined the
phrase “progressive plutocracy” to describe this attitude.114 By this
phrase, Key meant that North Carolina’s leaders had a “[w]illingness
to accept new ideas, [a] sense of community responsibility toward the
Negro, [a] feeling of common purpose, and relative prosperity [that
has] given North Carolina a more sophisticated politics than exists in

omitted)); William Alexander Mabry, White Supremacy and the North Carolina Suffrage
Amendment, 13 N.C. HIST. REV. 1, 1–5 (1936) (describing efforts to maintain the
disenfranchisement of black voters during the late 1800s).
110. See Republican Party of North Carolina v. Hunt, 841 F. Supp. 722, 726 (E.D.N.C.
1994) (“Until Judge Howard Manning, Jr.’s election, no Republican candidate for
Superior Court judge had been elected in this century.”); see also Todd Silberman & Tim
Simmons, 2004: Howard Manning Jr., NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Dec. 26, 2004),
http://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/article10355150.html
(describing
Manning’s
political affiliations, appointment to the superior court, and successful election in 1988).
111. See generally DEWEY W. GRANTHAM, THE LIFE & DEATH OF THE SOLID
SOUTH: A POLITICAL HISTORY (1988) (describing the political landscape surrounding the
formation and termination of the “Solid South” and the mechanics of the one-party
system used to implement continued racial segregation, disenfranchisement of AfricanAmericans, and malapportioned legislatures).
112. POWELL, supra note 66, at 438 (“The powerful single party was strongly in control
and provided little opportunity for debate, opposition, or the presentation of alternate
plans. . . . Victory in the spring primary nearly always was tantamount to election in
November. Issues might be debated and programs presented before the primary, but once
the primary was over the party unified to defeat the weak Republican opposition.”).
113. Sheldon Hackney, Origins of the New South in Retrospect, 38 J. S. HIST. 191, 191
(1972) (“It is the story of the decay and decline of the aristocracy, the suffering and
betrayal of the poor whites, and the rise and transformation of a middle class . . . . The
declining aristocracy are ineffectual and money hungry, and in the last analysis they
subordinated the values of their political and social heritage in order to maintain control
over the black population. The poor whites suffered from strange malignancies of racism
and conspiracy-mindedness, and the rising middle class was timid and self-interested even
in its reform movement.”).
114. See V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 205, 211 (1949).
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most southern states.”115 Modern observers now describe this attitude
as a myth.116
In the judicial sphere, the “progressive plutocracy” had the effect
of creating a system of judicial selection that was very stable in that,
once appointed, judges served for life and faced little, if any, practical
competition:
Until the 1970s nearly all judges were first appointed to the
bench. All judges were Democrats, as were all Governors. It
was expected that incumbent judges would time their
resignation or retirement at some point in the middle of a term
to allow the Governor to appoint a successor. New judgeships
were created in such a fashion that the initial occupant of the
judgeship was appointed by the Governor. Typically, that judge
then ran unopposed in both the primary and the general
election.117
The effect of this system was to create a judiciary dependent
upon the majority (Democratic) party for its employment. Judges
could repay this debt by refraining from taking cases that would
create political disruption of the system or by deciding cases in ways
that would advance the interests of the Democratic Party. While the
Solid South was considered to end nationally with the passage of the
Civil Rights Act in 1964, this mutual dependency lingered in the
judicial system for decades.118
One example of this mutual dependency dilemma is found in
State ex rel. Martin v. Preston.119 The Supreme Court of North
Carolina in Preston upheld a statutory requirement that trial court
judges must reside in a judicial district prior to announcing their

115. Id. at 210.
116. JACK BASS & WALTER DEVRIES, THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTHERN
POLITICS: SOCIAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCE SINCE 1945, at 219 (1995)
(“The progressive image the state projected in the late 1940s has evolved into a
progressive myth that remains accepted as fact by much of the state’s native leadership,
despite ample evidence to the contrary.”).
117. James C. Drennan, Judicial Reform in North Carolina, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN
THE STATES 19, 26 (Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993).
118. See Nate Cohn, Demise of the Southern Democrat is Now Nearly Complete, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/05/upshot/demise-of-thesouthern-democrat-is-now-nearly-compete.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=1 (“[While the
Democratic Party began shifting its position on civil rights in 1948,] Southern Democrats
would continue to dominate state and local politics for decades longer, slowly yielding to
Republicans only after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act, after which Mr. Thurmond
switched to the Republicans and became the first senator from the party to represent the
Deep South since Reconstruction.”).
119. 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989).
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candidacy, despite clear constitutional authority stating otherwise.120
Similarly, the supreme court has more recently upheld a statute
enacted during the administration of a Republican governor requiring
that, in the event of a judicial vacancy in a district court judgeship, a
governor appoint a replacement judge sharing the political affiliation
of the vacating judge.121 In addition to judicial preferences, the
general assembly enacted electoral statutes, such as counting rules for
crossover ballots, to advantage Democratic candidates in elections
until such measures were declared unconstitutional.122
This mutual dependency phenomenon has also been observed in
the federal system, where federal judges support the results in cases
that correspond with the interests of the party of the president that
appointed them.123 Finley Peter Dunne, a popular American humorist
in the early twentieth century, coined the apt phrase, “No matther
whether th’ constitutions follows th’ flag or not, th’ Supreme Coort
follows th’ election returns.”124 But unlike the justices of the United
States Supreme Court and other appointed federal judges who may
follow the returns, a judge in the state system is dependent upon the
election returns for continued employment.125
In North Carolina during this time period, the absence of a
strong Republican Party led to a system in which sitting judges from

120. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 9 (“Each regular Superior Court Judge shall reside in
the district for which he is elected.”); Preston, 325 N.C. at 461–62, 385 S.E.2d at 486.
121. See Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 341, 410 S.E.2d 887, 893 (1991); see also
Matthew P. McGuire, Note, Baker v. Martin and the Constitutionality of Partisan
Qualifications for Appointment to District Courts, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1916, 1928 (1992)
(arguing in favor of the dissenting opinions in Baker because the presumption of
constitutionality of the statute in question was overcome); cf. Charles H. Winfree, Note,
State ex rel. Martin v. Melott: The Separation of Powers and the Power to Appoint, 66 N.C.
L. REV. 1109, 1109–10 (1988) (discussing the court’s decision in State ex rel. Martin v.
Melott where the court upheld a statute creating appointment powers in the Supreme
Court of North Carolina despite contrary constitutional authority in the executive branch).
122. Hendon v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 633 F. Supp. 454, 459, 471 (W.D.N.C.
1986).
123. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 277–78 (2008) (“Evidence of the
powerful influence of politics on constitutional adjudication in the Supreme Court lies
everywhere at hand. Consider the emphasis placed in confirmation hearings on the
nominee’s ideology to the exclusion of his legal ability. Not a single question directed to
John Roberts in his hearing for confirmation as Chief Justice of the United States was
designed to test his legal acumen.”).
124. F.P. Dunne, Mr. Dooley Reviews the Supreme Court’s Decision, SUNDAY CHAT
(Paducah), June 9, 1901.
125. See POSNER, supra note 123, at 274 (“The usual external constraints on judicial
discretion [for federal courts] are severely attenuated except for public opinion . . . .”).
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the Democratic Party were rarely challenged.126 Thus, in my opinion,
any state litigation challenging the electoral structure in state court
would have been inconceivable because partisan elected judges would
ratify decisions of the legislature disadvantageous to political
opponents of the existing order.
In sum, relative judicial independence is easily achieved in a oneparty state, such as North Carolina from 1900 to 1960. Judges, once
elected, are secure from challenge so long as they do not upset the
existing order. A one-party government in which appointment follows
elections secures judges from competition. However, in my opinion,
the price of such stability is to give undue deference to legislative
decisions, presuming constitutionality of measures where political
rights are concerned, leaving insular minorities to seek relief from
federal instead of state courts. In a system where state constitutions
recognize rights not acknowledged in the federal constitution, this
presumption erodes the power of constitutional judicial review.
D. 1964 to 1986: The Voting Rights Act Era
The forces that shaped the one-party state system during the
period of “progressive plutocracy” unconsciously recreated the
archetypical system of judicial independence originally established
during the founding of the republic.127 Judges enjoyed relative judicial
independence because there was no political competition, hence
judges would effectively serve for life or during good behavior.128
With the arrival of political competition this system would change,
albeit gradually.
Structural and political change in a long-established state
government is the functional equivalent of tectonic plates shifting
beneath the earth’s crust. Minor tremors and adjustments,
individually insignificant in themselves, eventually lead to a major
earthquake in which the landscape that we once observed as
unchanging takes a new form. In political observation, most attention
is focused upon electoral battles in the legislative and executive
branches. But election law—centered in the First Amendment
freedoms of speech, of the press, to assemble, and to petition—and
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments provide the practical
126. See John J. Korzen, Comment, Changing North Carolina’s Method of Judicial
Selection, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 253, 265 (1990) (discussing the de facto control by the
Democratic Party over judicial selection and retention throughout North Carolina’s
history).
127. See supra notes 54–57, 113–15 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 119–26 and accompanying text.

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1825 (2015)

1844

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

framework in which the core constitutional political liberties are
effectuated. Thus, a change in the electoral laws and the application
of these fundamental freedoms foreshadows an adjustment in the
tectonic plates of the broader governmental structure.
While shifts in legislative and executive branches can be obvious
to the neutral observer, the shifts occurring in judicial elections are
not so clear, because they may only reflect trends occurring in the
“political” branches. Nevertheless, election law decisions designed to
address legislative election imbalances have parallel, and unintended,
consequences for judicial elections.
For example, beginning in the 1960s, the United States Supreme
Court held in Baker v. Carr129 and Reynolds v. Sims130 that state
legislative and congressional redistricting is subject to federal
constitutional review under the Equal Protection Clause.131 The Court
reasoned that this would assure that in any apportionment plan
enacted by the legislature, the districts would be populated so that
votes of citizens have an equivalent weight in elections.132 Reynolds
also held that decennial legislative redistricting would meet the
minimum constitutional requirements for “maintaining a reasonably
current scheme of legislative representation.”133 These principles were
applied to North Carolina in Drum v. Seawell134 and resulted in a
tectonic shift that created a tremor throughout the country by shifting
political voting power in the legislative branches from rural to urban
areas.135
In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which
prohibited racially discriminatory voting devices such as literacy tests
and poll taxes.136 Congress has since expanded or renewed the Act
five times, including the last reauthorization in 2006.137

129. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
130. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
131. Id. at 583–84; Baker, 369 U.S. at 186, 237.
132. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555–56; Baker, 369 U.S. at 207–08.
133. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583–84.
134. 249 F. Supp. 877 (M.D.N.C. 1965), aff’d, 383 U.S. 831 (1966).
135. See generally Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Reapportionment
and Party Realignment in the American States, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 433 (2004) (describing
how reapportionment of state legislatures during the 1960s caused a decline in rural
political power and an increase in urban and suburban representation).
136. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
52 U.S.C.).
137. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2012)). Section 4 of the 1965
Voting Rights Act, the coverage formula, 79 Stat. at 438, was declared unconstitutional in
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Prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act, North Carolina
began reforming its judiciary in the 1960s at the recommendation of a
North Carolina Bar Association panel known as the “Bell
Commission.”138 The reforms led to consolidation of the judiciary,
replacing the justice of the peace, county, and municipal courts with a
modern administrative whole.139 This model established district trial
courts for handling domestic cases, misdemeanors, and low-dollar
civil cases while providing for the election of district court judges by
local judicial districts consisting of one or more counties.140
A second tier of trial courts—superior courts—was designed to
handle the trials of felonies, criminal appeals from district courts, and
other civil litigation.141 At the time of the Bell Commission, superior
court judges were nominated by judicial districts and elected in
statewide elections.142 This system remained unchanged in the 1960s.
The Bell Commission reforms increased the appellate courts by
adding an intermediate court of appeals, which was nominated and
elected statewide.143 While this intermediate appellate court has
grown from an initial six judges to fifteen judges today, the system
retained a seven justice supreme court.144 However, elections for all
judges and justices were by partisan primary until the early 2000s.145
Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), and revisions to reauthorize Section 5 of
the Act are currently pending in Congress.
138. N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN NORTH
CAROLINA 3 (2007). (“The committee, named the Committee on Improving and
Expediting the Administration of Justice in North Carolina, was known as the ‘Bell
Commission’ because its chairman was J. Spencer Bell, an attorney from Charlotte. After
a thorough study, the Bell Commission recommended a complete restructuring of the
judicial system to the general assembly. In 1962, the voters of North Carolina approved a
constitutional amendment creating North Carolina’s present court system. The system
began operation in 1966.”).
139. See N.C. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON IMPROVING AND
EXPEDITING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NORTH CAROLINA 1–6 (1958).
140. See id.; N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE NORTH CAROLINA JUDICIAL
SYSTEM 4 (2008), www.nccourts.org/citizens/publications/documents/judicialsystem.pdf.
141. See N.C. BAR ASS’N, supra note 139, at 11.
142. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-1 (1960); see also Act of Aug. 2, 1996, ch. 9, § 7, 1996
N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess. 536, 541–47 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163) (changing the election of superior court judges from statewide to
by superior court district); N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 140, at 20
(supporting the assertion of nomination by judicial districts).
143. See sources cited supra note 142.
144. See sources cited supra note 142.
145. See Act of Oct. 10, 2002, ch. 509, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 615, 626 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163) (changing the election of
appellate court judges and justices from partisan to nonpartisan); 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d
Extra Sess. at 541–47 (changing the election of superior court judges from partisan to
nonpartisan).
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The first elections following the passage of the Bell Commission
reforms were conducted in 1966. In the 1968 election, Elreta
Alexander, a black female Republican lawyer, won an at-large
election as a district court judge in Guilford County for a four-year
term.146 After her success, the 1969 general assembly amended the
judicial elections act, changing district court judicial elections from atlarge to numbered seats.147 Despite this change, Judge Alexander was
subsequently reelected in 1972 and served thereafter until 1981.148 In
1974, she entered the Republican primary for Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina to challenge then-sitting Chief
Justice Susan Sharp.149 However, Judge Alexander was defeated in
the primary by a fire extinguisher salesman and Chief Justice Sharp
went on to win the general election.150 As a result of this election, the
North Carolina General Assembly proposed—and the people
ratified—a constitutional amendment requiring all elected justices
and judges to be licensed to practice law in North Carolina.151
Following the Bell Commission and the passage of the Voting
Rights Act, equal protection litigation applying the principles of
Baker and Reynolds successfully sought changes in election districting
in city councils and county commissions,152 school boards,153 and other
units of local government dependent upon elections for their
governing bodies. Yet, the principles of vote dilution by districting
were not then applied to judicial elections by federal courts.154
An early attempt by Republicans to apply the principles of Baker
and Reynolds to judicial elections was Holshouser v. Scott.155 In
Holshouser, James Holshouser, then-chairman of the state
Republican Party, sought a declaratory judgment that North
146. KAYE R. WEBB ET AL., N.C. ASS’N OF BLACK LAWYERS, 3 CHRONICLE OF
BLACK LAWYERS IN NORTH CAROLINA: AFRICAN AMERICAN FEMALE PIONEERS IN
SEARCH OF JUSTICE AND EQUALITY: 1947–1990, at 25–26 (Robin N. Michael et al. eds.,
1990).
147. See Korzen, supra note 126, at 265.
148. See Virginia Summey, Redefining Activism: Judge Elreta Alexander Ralston and
Civil Rights Advocacy in the New South, 90 N.C. HIST. REV. 237, 251, 256 (2013).
149. Patricia Timmons-Goodson, “Darlin’, The Truth Will Set You Free,”—A Tribute
to Judge Elreta Melton Alexander, 4 ELON L. REV. 151, 170 (2012).
150. Id. at 170–72.
151. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 22; see Timmons-Goodson, supra note 149, at 172.
152. Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474, 474–86 (1968).
153. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 621–22, 633 (1969).
154. See, e.g., N.Y. State Ass’n of Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148, 154
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Buchanan v. Rhodes, 249 F. Supp. 860, 865 (N.D. Ohio 1966), appeal
dismissed, 385 U.S. 3, judgment vacated on procedural grounds, 400 F.2d 882 (6th Cir.
1968); Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575, 577 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
155. 335 F. Supp. 928 (M.D.N.C. 1971), aff’d, 409 U.S. 807 (1972).

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1825 (2015)

2015]

ELECTIONS & JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

1847

Carolina’s system of nomination by districts and statewide election of
judges violated the Equal Protection Clause.156 Following other
federal precedent cited above, a three-judge panel held that:
While Buchanan and Rockefeller deal with the apportionment
of judges rather than their election, they nevertheless point up
the many pitfalls and briar patches which the courts will
encounter if the one man, one vote principle is made applicable
to the judiciary. The function of judges, contrary to some
popular views of today, is not to make, but to interpret the law.
They do not govern nor represent people, nor espouse the
cause of a particular constituency. They must decide cases
exclusively on the basis of law and justice, and not upon the
popular view prevailing at the time.157
The court’s opinion that judges do not make, but only interpret,
the law became the predominant view in all subsequent litigation
involving judicial election and appointment. But this view
demonstrates a misunderstanding of the role of state judges insofar as
it presumes that state judges are not distinguishable from federal
judges when, inter alia, state judges are “representatives.” Once
federal judges obtain office, they need not bother about popular
accountability, except for impeachable offenses. State judges, by
contrast, do not enjoy this luxury. The resulting cost of popular
accountability to state judges is a loss of relative independence. The
benefit is that elected state judges may have legitimacy in disputes
involving separation of powers because they, like the coordinate
branches of government, are elected by the people to enforce the
state constitution.
By concentrating on the characteristics of the job once obtained,
federal courts missed the proper focus on the central inquiry in equal
protection analysis. The focus should be on the mechanism by which
one becomes a judge and maintains office. The focus of the judicial
inquiry is not how the judge performs the job once elected, but
instead whether the electoral mechanism being employed is “fair” as
determined by the Equal Protection Clause. This misstep is the
equivalent of saying that one need not be concerned with “one
person, one vote” analytics for legislative elections if legislators act
properly once in office. Furthermore, the analysis misses the point of
retention. Maintaining office presents an entirely different set of

156. Id. at 929.
157. Id. at 932.
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questions for sitting judges—raising fundamental questions of relative
judicial independence.
In 1966, Seawell opened the door for litigation of electoral
districts in North Carolina based on the Equal Protection Clause.158
By the late 1960s, the effects of the Seawell litigation in the North
Carolina General Assembly augmented the representation of urban
counties by increasing the number of legislators elected from urban
areas.159 This increase enabled Henry Frye to be elected to the
general assembly in 1968 as the first African-American legislator in
the twentieth century.160 It also provided an opportunity for urban
Republicans to be elected. In the 1970s redistricting, the same effect
occurred in other urban counties so that by the beginning of the 1980
redistricting cycle, the legislative branch had allocated more seats to
urban counties with significant populations of African-Americans and
Republicans.161
However, the 1970 legislative districts as drafted were at-large
elections for numbered seats, which in operation favored white
candidates from the majority party.162 During the 1970s, voting rights
groups across the country initiated a series of cases to end at-large
elections of legislators through the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.163 The efforts to end at-large elections based on the
Fourteenth Amendment were unsuccessful.164 However, efforts to end
at-large elections based on the racial discrimination theories of the
Fifteenth Amendment were successful in White v. Regester.165 In
Regester, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the 1970

158. See Drum v. Seawell, 249 F. Supp. 877, 879 (M.D.N.C. 1965), aff’d, 383 U.S. 831
(1966).
159. See RESEARCH DIV., N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, LEGISLATOR’S GUIDE TO NORTH
CAROLINA LEGISLATIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 25–26 (2011), available at
http://www.ncleg.net/GIS/Download/Maps_Reports/2011RedistrictingGuide.pdf
(discussing the North Carolina General Assembly’s revisions to the state’s legislative and
congressional redistricting plans throughout the 1960s as a result of the Seawell litigation
and examining the impact on elections from the revised plans’ reductions in the
population deviation across election districts).
160. Adrienne Dunn, Henry Frye (1932– ), N.C. HIST. PROJECT, http://www
.northcarolinahistory.org/encyclopedia/319/entry/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
161. See Paul T. O’Connor, Reapportionment and Redistricting: Redrawing the Political
Landscape, N.C. INSIGHT, Dec. 1990, at 35, available at http://www.nccppr.org/drupal
/system/files/protected/insight_article/pdf/Reapportionment_and_Redistricting.pdf.
162. Id. at 35–36.
163. See, e.g., Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1301 (5th Cir. 1973).
164. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 142–43 (1971) (reaffirming its position that
multimember districts are not unconstitutional per se).
165. 412 U.S. 755, 769–70 (1973).

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1825 (2015)

2015]

ELECTIONS & JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

1849

reapportionment plan for the Texas House of Representatives.166 The
Court initially held that the variations in population among the
districts were not invidiously discriminatory.167 Nevertheless, the
Court upheld the dismantling of two of the districts because of the
history of discrimination against minorities residing in those two
districts.168
Accordingly, litigants began challenging at-large multimember
districts based upon theories grounded in Regester with some
success.169 But, any initial success ended in 1982, when the United
States Supreme Court issued its decision in Mobile v. Bolden.170
Mobile held that, if enacted without discriminatory intent, at-large
multimember districts that submerge minority votes do not violate
either Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the Fifteenth
Amendment.171 In reaction to this decision, Congress amended the
Voting Rights Act in 1982 to revise Section 2.172 Congress substituted
a totality of the circumstances test in lieu of the Fifteenth
Amendment test that Mobile announced.173 This case history shows
that while the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection might be insufficient to reach judicial elections, the
Fifteenth Amendment’s proscription against racial discrimination was
not.
The Court’s combined use of Section 5 and Section 2 in Mobile is
instructive to explain how the Voting Rights Act altered judicial
elections. Unlike Section 2, which requires lengthy litigation involving
fact-intensive proof, Section 5 gives plaintiffs the ability to obtain
rapid injunctive relief by determining whether or not a “covered
jurisdiction” like North Carolina has made a voting change and

166. Id. at 756.
167. Id. at 769–70.
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Paige v. Gray, 538 F.2d 1108, 1110–12 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing Regester and
remanding “to determine whether any at-large elections at all should be allowed”);
Kendrick v. Walder, 527 F.2d 44, 49–51 (7th Cir. 1975) (successfully challenging at-large
municipal elections in Illinois); Hendrix v. McKinney, 460 F. Supp. 626, 637 (M.D. Ala.
1978) (holding that the at-large plan for the election of county commissioners was
“constitutionally deficient”).
170. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
171. Id. at 78–80.
172. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982) (amending Section 2 and allowing for
violations of the Voting Rights Act without proof of a discriminatory intent or purpose).
173. For a discussion of the first case to apply the new Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, see infra notes 183–90 and accompanying text. See also Robert Hunter, Racial
Gerrymandering in North Carolina, 9 CAMPBELL L. REV. 255, 277–78 (1986).
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whether that change has been submitted to and received preclearance
from the Department of Justice.174
In order to receive preclearance, the voting change must
overcome a presumption of racial discrimination in purpose and
effect.175 If a jurisdiction cannot overcome the presumption, then the
voting change will be rejected, or “objected to,” and a federal court
should enjoin its administration.176 For example, in 1981, the North
Carolina General Assembly submitted its first redistricting plans for
preclearance.177 The plan did not receive preclearance, and it was thus
“objected to” for failing to provide legislative districts in which
minorities constituted a majority of the electorate.178 After the
Department of Justice objected to two additional plans, the
legislature enacted a plan that met Section 5 preclearance in the
covered areas of North Carolina by creating “black single-member”
districts in the house and senate.179 Subsequently in Gingles v.
Edmisten,180 black plaintiffs challenged the legislative districting
scheme.181 The district court ordered the legislature to redistrict,
demanding seven more black single-member house districts and two
more black single-member senate districts.182 The United States
Supreme Court reversed as to one district, but affirmed the
redistricting order as to the other districts.183 In Thornburg v.
Gingles,184 the Court used amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act to uphold redistricting, holding that “the language of [Section 2]
and its legislative history plainly demonstrate that proof that some
minority candidates have been elected does not foreclose a [Section
2] claim.”185
The elimination of multi-member districts provided electoral
opportunities for insular minorities submerged under the at-large
system.186 The creation of single-member, heavily Democratic black
174. See 52 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012).
175. See Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 652–54 (1991).
176. Id.
177. See O’Connor, supra note 161, at 30–31.
178. See id. at 35–36.
179. Id.
180. 590 F. Supp. 345 (1984), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30 (1986).
181. Id. at 349; O’Connor, supra note 161, at 36.
182. See O’Connor, supra note 161, at 36.
183. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 77.
184. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
185. Id. at 75.
186. See Michael E. Lewyn, When is Cumulative Voting Preferable to Single-Member
Districting?, 25 N.M. L. REV. 197, 200 (1995) (arguing that in the decade since the
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districts created Republican-leaning districts elsewhere. The practical
effect of this application is to show how the legislative landscape was
altered dramatically from 1981 until 1993. The number of black
legislators in the North Carolina House rose from three to eleven
after the 1982 election.187 By 1993, there were eighteen black
legislators in the house and six in the senate.188 Similar growth
occurred in Republican numbers, which rose from twenty-four in the
house and ten in the senate in 1981, to thirty-nine in the house and
fourteen in the senate by 1991.189 Gingles thus illustrates how minority
groups used Section 5 and Section 2 to bring about electoral changes
that the Equal Protection Clause could not achieve.190
A parallel strategy was used to change judicial elections in North
Carolina. In Haith v Martin,191 Terry Haith, an African-American
Republican voter obtained a Section 5 injunction preventing elections
for state superior court judgeships created after November 1, 1964,

Supreme Court decided Thornburg v. Gingles, “Section 2 [of the Voting Rights Act of
1965] has revolutionized electoral laws in areas with large minority populations”). Indeed,
as Lewyn notes, “[m]any state and local governments have remedied Section 2 violations
by abolishing multimember and at-large systems and replacing them with single-member
districting, thereby ensuring that minorities could elect at least one municipal legislator.”
Id. (citations omitted).
187. QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT,
1965–1990, at 166 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994).
188. See THAD EURE, N.C. DEP’T OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE, NORTH CAROLINA
MANUAL 1981–1982, at 219, 292, 306, 357 (John L. Cheney, Jr. ed., 1981) [hereinafter 1981
MANUAL] (providing descriptions of the four black legislators in the 1981 North Carolina
General Assembly and Senate); RUFUS L. EDMISTEN, N.C. DEP’T OF THE SEC’Y OF
STATE, NORTH CAROLINA MANUAL 1993–1994, at 362 (Lisa A. Marcus ed., 1994)
[hereinafter 1993 MANUAL] (“Twenty-four African-Americans have been elected to serve
in the 1993 legislature—six in the Senate and [eighteen] in the House of
Representatives.”).
189. See 1981 MANUAL, supra note 188, at 199–200 (listing members of the North
Carolina Senate in 1981); id. at 273–75 (listing members of the North Carolina House of
Representatives in 1981); RUFUS L. EDMISTEN, N.C. DEP’T OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE,
NORTH CAROLINA MANUAL 1991–1992, at 223–24 (Julie W. Snee ed., 1991) [hereinafter
1991 MANUAL] (listing members of the North Carolina Senate in 1991); id. at 297–99
(listing members of the North Carolina House of Representatives in 1991). The North
Carolina House of Representatives has 120 members and the North Carolina Senate has
50 members. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 22; id. art. II, §§ 2, 4.
190. See supra notes 129–35, 169–85 and accompanying text. The Court in Thornburg
observed that the “overall rate of black electoral success has been minimal in relation to
the percentage of blacks in the total state population,” noting that from 1971 to 1982,
“only 1.6% to 3.3% of House members were black” and that from 1975 to 1983, “only 2%
to 4% of State Senators were black.” 478 U.S. at 40. “By contrast,” the Court continued,
“at the time of the District Court’s opinion [in Gingles], blacks constituted about 22.4% of
the total state population.” Id.
191. 618 F. Supp. 410 (E.D.N.C. 1985), aff’d, 477 U.S. 901 (1986).
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that had not been precleared.192 The court agreed with Haith that the
legislature had not appropriately submitted these voting changes for
preclearance.193 Key to this case and subsequent Section 5 litigation
was the holding that Congress meant “to reach any state enactment
which altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor
way,”194 and “that the fact that an election law deals with the election
of members of the judiciary does not remove it from the ambit of
section 5.”195
The state subsequently submitted the superior court judicial
districts to the Justice Department for preclearance. After
submission, the Justice Department objected because of the use of
numbered seats in combination with staggered terms in judicial
elections.196 This plan failed to meet the requirements of Section 5
because it eliminated minority voters’ ability to concentrate their
voting power on a single candidate in a multi-judge race.197
The next case in this line of challenges to North Carolina’s
system of judicial elections, Alexander v. Martin,198 was a Section 2
case. Kelly Alexander, the state chairman of the NAACP, challenged
North Carolina’s method for nominating superior court judges by
district and electing such judges statewide.199 Alexander contended
that district nominations combined with statewide elections of
superior court judges, staggered terms, and the use of large multijudge districts in the primaries submerged African-Americans’ local
majorities, preventing them from successfully obtaining election to
the superior court bench.200
The end of statewide elections of superior court judges had the
political potential to eradicate all sitting incumbent Democratic
judges in Republican-leaning judicial districts. In addition, there was
192. Id. at 411–12, 414.
193. Id. at 414.
194. Id. (quoting Dougherty Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 37 (1978)).
195. Id.
196. James C. Drennan, Judicial Reform in North Carolina, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN
THE STATES 19, 28–29 (Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993).
197. See ANITA S. EARLS, EMILY WYNES & LEEANNE QUATRUUCI, VOTING RIGHTS
IN NORTH CAROLINA 1982–2006, at app. 2 (2006), available at http:// www
.protectcivilrights.org/pdf/voting/NorthCarolinaVRA.pdf.
198. No. 86-1048-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (unpublished), discussed in Milton C. Jordan,
Black Legislators: From Political Novelty to Political Force, N.C. INSIGHT, Dec. 1989, at
40, 43, 58 n.10.
199. See Republican Party of North Carolina v. Hunt, 841 F. Supp. 722, 725 (E.D.N.C.
1994) (discussing the court’s unpublished decision in Alexander), aff’d as modified sub
nom. Republican Party of North Carolina v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 27 F.3d 563, 1994
WL 265955 (4th Cir. June 17, 1994) (unpublished table decision).
200. Id.
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some concern that judgments entered by judges elected improperly
might be subject to collateral attack. Because of these potential
consequences, the parties in Alexander decided to settle the lawsuit.201
The legislature settled Alexander by passing Chapter 509 of the
Session Laws of 1987.202 Chapter 509 further subdivided the state’s six
largest urban counties into subdistricts and eliminated staggered
terms.203 These changes led to an increase in the number of AfricanAmericans on the superior court bench from one in 1986204 to twelve
in 1994.205 Also by 1994, three African-American state appellate court
judges had been elected.206 Later in Chisom v. Roemer,207 the United
States Supreme Court ratified the decisions in Haith and Martin, as
well as the logic of settling the Alexander litigation, when it
determined that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was violated in a
case involving a challenge to the election of superior court judges
from multi-member districts.208
II. 1986–2002: EVENTS THAT LED THE LEGISLATURE TO ADOPT A
NONPARTISAN, PUBLICLY FINANCED SYSTEM
The final assault on the state’s trial court system of judicial
elections came in Republican Party of North Carolina v. Martin.209
While Alexander addressed the concerns of racial minorities, it did
not address the concerns of North Carolina’s Republicans.
Republican judges had been successfully elected to district court
offices in North Carolina, but the statewide election feature of
superior court elections still prevented political minorities from
winning statewide. This submergence, and the prospect of sure defeat,

201. See EARLS ET AL., supra note 197, at 26–27.
202. Id.
203. Act of June 29, 1987, ch. 509, sec. 1, § 7A-41, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 769, 769–76
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-41 (2013)).
204. THE JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL STUDIES & THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE
NAT’L BAR ASS’N, ELECTED AND APPOINTED BLACK JUDGES IN THE UNITED STATES
68 (1986) (identifying Special Judge James E. Beady, Jr.).
205. JUDICIAL ADMIN. DIV., AM. BAR ASS’N, THE DIRECTORY OF MINORITY
JUDGES IN THE UNITED STATES 70–71 (1st ed. 1994).
206. Id. at 70.
207. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
208. Id. at 402–04; see also Houston Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Attorney Gen. of Texas, 501
U.S. 419, 428 (1991) (holding that the VRA’s coverage encompasses the election of
executive officers and trial judges); Clark v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 646, 659–60 (1991)
(reversing decision of federal district court in Louisiana that failed to enjoin state elections
for judicial seats pursuant to voting statutes that had not obtained preclearance).
209. 980 F.2d 943, 961 (4th Cir. 1992).
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had the effect of crippling party efforts to recruit candidates, raise
funds, and electioneer.
To remedy this crippling effect, in Martin, the Republican Party
of North Carolina filed suit against the North Carolina State Board of
Elections, alleging that the method of electing superior court judges
in North Carolina deprived members of the Republican Party of
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution.210 The district court granted the state board of
election’s motion to dismiss for absence of a justiciable question,211
but the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the Republican Party
did state a claim upon which relief may be granted under the
Fourteenth Amendment.212 The opinion effectively reversed
Holshouser v. Scott, which held that the one-person one-vote rule
“does not apply to the state judiciary, and therefore a mere showing
of disparity . . . would not be sufficient to strike down th[e] election
procedure.”213 The Fourth Circuit’s reversal in Martin was based upon
Davis v. Bandemer,214 where the United States Supreme Court held
vote dilution claims of political parties to be justiciable. On remand,
the district court entered a preliminary injunction before the 1994
superior court elections were filed, ordering that the defendant state
board of elections keep statistics showing the outcome of elections of
superior court judges in both districts and statewide.215 This result was
substantially affirmed by the Fourth Circuit in an unpublished
opinion, Republican Party of North Carolina v. North Carolina State
Board of Elections.216
The Republican Party lawsuit was eventually settled by
legislation to avoid the consequences of having judicial elections
without certainty of the outcomes.217 Subsequent legislation validated
the elections of 1994, decreed local elections in both primary and
general elections, and after two election cycles determined that
superior court judicial elections beginning in 1998 would be
210. Id. at 946–47.
211. 682 F. Supp. 834, 837 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
212. 980 F.2d at 961.
213. 335 F. Supp. 928, 932 (M.D.N.C. 1971) (holding that the one-person, one-vote rule
“does not apply to the state judiciary”).
214. 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986).
215. Republican Party of North Carolina v. Hunt, 841 F. Supp. 722, 733–34 (1994),
aff’d as modified sub nom. Republican Party of North Carolina v. N.C. State Bd. of
Elections, 27 F.3d 563, 1994 WL 265955 (4th Cir. June 17, 1994) (unpublished table
decision).
216. 27 F.3d 563, 1994 WL 265955 (4th Cir. June 17, 1994).
217. Act of Aug. 2, 1996, ch. 9, § 1, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess. 536, 536
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-41.2 (2013)).

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1825 (2015)

2015]

ELECTIONS & JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

1855

conducted on a nonpartisan basis.218 This change in selecting judges
was the first fundamental change in the way North Carolina selected
its superior court judges since 1868.
About the same time as the legislature settled the Republican
Party lawsuit in 1994, a commission headed by John Medlin and
former Chief Justice Rhoda Billings, entitled the “Commission on the
Future of Justice and the Courts in North Carolina,” was formed to
make recommendations to the general assembly for modernizing the
judicial branch.219 Replacing elections with judicial appointment was
among the recommendations.220 But, these recommendations met the
same fate as other merit proposals.221
Despite these procedural advances that promoted competition in
judicial elections, Democrats continued to dominate the North
Carolina appellate division elections. Aside from Republicans Robert
Orr and Howard Manning—each winning elections for the North
Carolina Court of Appeals and superior court respectively—no other
Republican judicial candidate had yet won an election in modern
times.222 In 1992, Democratic Justices Henry Frye and Burley Mitchell
both ran unopposed for election.223 The Republican lack of success
may have been due in part to the lack of party financial assistance to
judges and the widely held view that statewide judicial races were
hopeless.
Nevertheless, elections for statewide judicial offices became
more competitive. For example, Republican supreme court candidate
I. Beverley Lake, Jr. (the son of a former supreme court justice and
the 1980 Republican gubernatorial candidate) lost his bid for election
to the Supreme Court of North Carolina in both 1990 and again in
1992 after being appointed to the court in 1992 by Governor
218. Id. § 24, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess. at 555.
219. For the Commission’s findings and recommendations, see COMM’N FOR THE
FUTURE OF JUSTICE AND THE COURTS IN N.C., WITHOUT FAVOR, DENIAL OR DELAY:
A COURT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1996), available at http:// www.ncleg.net
/Library/studies/1996/st12134.pdf.
220. See id. at 9, 12.
221. See Michael Cromwell, Back to the Future: Revisiting the Recommendations of the
Commission for the Future of Justice and Courts in North Carolina, N.C. ST. B.J., Summer
2009, at 8, 8–11, 15; see also Samuel Latham Grimes, Comment, “Without Favor, Denial or
Delay”: Will North Carolina Finally Adopt the Merit Selection of Judges?, 76 N.C. L. REV.
2266 passim (1998) (detailing recommendations put forward by the Futures Commission
and comparing the Commission’s reform proposal to past efforts at judicial reform in
North Carolina).
222. See Joseph Neff, Republicans Win Every Race for Seats on Appellate Courts,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Nov. 9, 1994, at 1B.
223. See Thad Beyle, The NC Supreme Court Power Shift, 1990–2000, N.C. DATANET
(Program on S. Politics, Media & Pub. Life, Chapel Hill, N.C.), Sept. 2002, at 10, 10 tbl.1.

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1825 (2015)

1856

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

Martin.224 However, Lake’s 1990 race was very close and
foreshadowed that a change was occurring in Republican fortunes.225
In 1994, the Republican drought in judicial races ended with four
Republican candidates winning appellate elections.226 These
Republican victories were dubbed the GOP’s “biggest court wins of
the century.”227
While Republicans enjoyed a victory in 1994, the pattern of
shifting tides along partisan lines continued. In 1996, a presidential
year in which Bill Clinton won nationally, two Democratic incumbent
candidates were reelected to the Supreme Court of North Carolina:
Chief Justice Burley Mitchell and Justice Sarah Parker.228 The
fortunes of judicial candidates closely followed the national
popularity of the party with which they were affiliated.229 This pattern

224. See Joseph Neff, Parker Elected to State High Court, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh), Nov. 4, 1992, at 14A.
225. Lake v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 798 F. Supp. 1199, 1199 n.1 (M.D.N.C. 1992)
(“After a recount, incumbent John Webb had a 15,405-vote margin in Durham County
and a 2,641-vote margin in Guilford County. In the remaining ninety-eight counties, Lake
had a margin of 16,169 votes over Webb. The State Board concluded by a vote of 3–2 that
irregularities in Durham County could have affected the state-wide results and that a new
election should be held in that county. The Board voted unanimously that the
irregularities in Guilford County could not have affected the statewide results and that the
results in that county be certified. The Board then voted 3–2 to certify the results as
counted in all 100 counties. Under North Carolina General Statute § 163-22.1 four
members of the five-member State Board must vote for a new election before one can be
held. Therefore, the Board’s 3–2 conclusion concerning Durham County did not result in a
new election in that county.”). Lake lost the 1990 election to Democratic incumbent John
Webb by only 1,897 votes. See Lake Drops Legal Challenge to 1990 Election, TIMES-NEWS
(Hendersonville), June 4, 1992, at 10A. An election protest followed the election when a
superior court judge ordered polling officials in Guilford County and Durham County, a
heavily Democratic county, to keep its polls open later in the state to accommodate voters
who were allegedly experiencing long lines because of the United States Senate race
between Harvey Gantt and Jesse Helms. See Lake, 798 F. Supp. at 1202; see also Steve
Riley, Problems Frustrate Some Voters, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Nov. 7, 1990, at
1A.
226. See Neff, supra note 222, at 1B.
227. Id.
228. See N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 1996 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS:
SUPREME COURT, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, ftp://alt.ncsbe.gov/data/ElectResults/1996_11_05
/19961105_results_Associate_Justice_NC_Supreme_Court.pdf (last updated Dec. 6, 2011);
N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 1996 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS: SUPREME COURT,
CHIEF JUSTICE, ftp://alt.ncsbe.gov/data/ElectResults/1996_11_05/19961105_results_Chief
_Justice_NC_Supreme_Court.pdf (last updated Dec. 6, 2011).
229. See sources cited supra note 228. For example, in 1996, a majority of North
Carolinians voted for the Democratic candidates for the nonjudicial positions of attorney
general (Mike Easley), governor (Jim Hunt), and secretary of state (Elaine Marshall),
among others. See, e.g., N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, CERTIFICATION OF THE
RESULTS OF THE GENERAL ELECTION HELD ON NOVEMBER 5, 1996 BY THE STATE
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of judicial election outcome based on party affiliation had been noted
in competitive local district court races where all Republican
candidates would oust Democratic incumbents and vice-versa.230
Subsequently, in 1998, two wins by Mark Martin and George
Wainwright created a four-justice Republican majority on the
supreme court for the first time since 1900.231 Nonetheless, other
Democratic candidates won in 1998,232 providing evidence that
national trends may not perfectly forecast partisan judicial election
results. Still, the Republican ascendancy continued in the 2002 judicial
election cycle, which produced a six-to-one Republican majority on
the supreme court.233
BOARD OF ELECTIONS AT THE CANVASS, ftp://alt.ncsbe.gov/data/ElectResults/1996_11
_05/19961105_elected_candidate_list.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
230. See Louis Alfred Trosch, Sr., Is it Time to Change the Way North Carolina Selects
Judges?, 36 BUS. L. REV. 197, 210 (2003) (describing this phenomenon as occurring from
the 1960s to the 1980s).
231. See N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, RECOUNTS CONDUCTED ON NOVEMBER 17
AND 18 (Nov. 24, 1998), ftp://alt.ncsbe.gov/data/ElectResults/1998_11_03/19981103_results
_Justice_NC_Supreme_Court_Webb.pdf (documenting Republican Wainwright’s win over
Democrat Wynn); N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 1998 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS:
JUSTICE NC SUPREME COURT—WHICHARD [hereinafter 1998 GENERAL ELECTION
RESULTS: JUSTICE NC SUPREME COURT—WHICHARD], available at ftp://alt.ncsbe.gov/data
/ElectResults/1998_11_03/19981103_results_Justice_NC_Supreme_Court_Whichard.pdf
(last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (documenting Republican Mark Martin’s win over Democrat
Jim Martin). Thus, the political makeup of the court became four Republicans—Lake,
Orr, Martin, and Wainwright—and three Democrats—Frye, Parker, and Freeman.
232. For example, John Edwards won the United States Senate seat for North Carolina
in 1998. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, U.S. SENATE ELECTION RESULTS, ftp://alt.ncsbe
.gov/data/ElectResults/1998_11_03/19981103_results_us_senate.pdf (last visited Aug. 17,
2015).
233. In the 2002 election, sitting Democratic Justice Butterfield was defeated by
Republican Justice Brady. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 2002 GENERAL ELECTION
RESULTS,
https://www.ncsbe.gov/ncsbe/Elections/Election-Results-Display?ED1
=11xx05xx2002&EL1=GENERAL&YR1=2002&CR1=A (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
Republican Justice Bob Orr won reelection over Democratic challenger Bob C. Hunter.
Id. As a result, the political makeup of the court was six Republicans—Lake, Wainwright,
Orr, Edmunds, Martin, Brady—and one Democrat—Parker. See 356 N.C. at vii (2004),
available at http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/html/volumes/ncsct356.pdf (providing a
list of sitting supreme court justices); N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 1996 GENERAL
ELECTION RESULTS: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NC SUPREME COURT, available at ftp://alt
.ncsbe.gov/data/ElectResults/1996_11_05/19961105_results_Associate_Justice_NC
_Supreme_Court.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (showing Sarah Parker as a Democratic
candidate); N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 1998 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS: JUSTICE
NC SUPREME COURT – WEBB, available at ftp://alt.ncsbe.gov/data/ElectResults/1998_11
_03/19981103_results_Justice_NC_Supreme_Court_Webb.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2015)
(showing George Wainwright as a Republican candidate); 1998 GENERAL ELECTION
RESULTS: JUSTICE NC SUPREME COURT—WHICHARD, supra note 230 (showing Mark
Martin as a Republican candidate); N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 2000 GENERAL
ELECTION RESULTS: ASSOC JUSTICE NC SUPREME COURT, available at ftp://alt.ncsbe.gov
/data/ElectResults/2000_11_07/20001107_results_Assoc_Justice_NC_Supreme_Court.pdf
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These explanations do not take into account the role that
campaign expenditures play in judicial elections. Before and during
the 1990s, election results could logically be related to national
political trends when the costs of judicial elections were modest. In
other words, individual expenditures by candidates failed to impact
the elections when opposition party candidates were riding a wave of
general party success:
The three most expensive races over the period were won by
candidates spending [between] 20.4% to 31.3% of the total
amounts spent by all candidates in their races. Overall, five of
the winners spent less than their opponents, [and] seven
winners spent more than their opponents.234
Over this decade, the costs of electioneering for judicial seats
increased dramatically, as shown by the following chart:

(last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (showing Robert Edmunds as a Republican candidate); N.C.
STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 2000 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS: CHIEF JUSTICE NC
SUPREME COURT, available at ftp://alt.ncsbe.gov/data/ElectResults/2000_11_07/20001107
_results_Chief_Justice_NC_Supreme_Court.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (showing
Beverly Lake as a Republican candidate).
234. Beyle, supra note 223, at 11.
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Chart A. Total Costs, N.C. Supreme Court Elections
1992 to 2000235
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Despite the rising and falling tide of partisan-identified success in
judicial elections, Democrats maintained control of the governor’s
office from 1993 until 2012.236 Democrats also controlled at least one
house of the general assembly during this same period and controlled
both houses for most of this period.237 Neither political parties nor
special-interest groups were particularly interested in the judicial
branch elections—and thus they were unwilling to invest large sums
of money in such elections—until the 2000 redistricting cycle began.238
This disinterest from political donors was soon to change when
donors realized many of the legislative issues they had an interest in
235. Id.
236. See North Carolina: Past Governors Bios, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, http://www
.nga.org/cms/home/governors/past-governors-bios/page_north_carolina.html (last visited
Aug. 17, 2015).
237. See Gary D. Robertson, State Republicans Win Majorities in NC Legislature,
TIMES-NEWS ONLINE (Nov. 3, 2010), http:// www.blueridgenow.com/article/20101103
/ARTICLES/101109939 (documenting the historic Republican win in the legislature in
2010). “Republicans haven’t led both chambers together since their Fusion coalition with
farmers got defeated in 1898. That includes a 112-year losing streak in the Senate and only
four years of House control in the 1990s.” Id.
238. See Beyle, supra note 223, at 11 (noting that the 2000 elections corresponded with
an increase in election spending and showing that the winning candidate’s share of
campaign spending has decreased over time).
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could be resolved through the judiciary. Put differently, why try to
influence a majority of two bodies of a total of 170 people, when
getting a majority of four in the supreme court would do as well or
better?
For example, the North Carolina Republican Party must have
realized the daunting task of challenging the 2000 state legislative and
congressional redistricting plans and seeking to enact a
reapportionment plan while the Democratic Party dominated the
state’s legislative bodies.239 In 1993, the United States Supreme Court
held in Growe v. Emison240 that federal courts had to abstain from
considering constitutional challenges to state legislative redistricting
plans when federal and state courts were simultaneously considering
such an issue.241 Given that the only branch of government that was
controlled by the Republicans in 2001 was the judicial branch,242 this
gave the Republicans a more favorable forum than the legislature.
After the 2000 census, Ashley Stephenson, a Republican
plaintiff, sought to enjoin and have declared unconstitutional the 2001
redistricting plans enacted by the Democratic-controlled general
assembly.243 He began his challenge in state rather than federal court
using a new constitutional theory based upon the “whole county”
clause of the North Carolina Constitution.244 This theory required the
general assembly in drafting districts to “harmonize” the federal
requirements of the “one-person, one-vote” rule and Voting Rights
Act with article II, sections 2 and 4, of the Constitution of North
Carolina, which require that districts be based on “whole counties.”245
In Stephenson v. Bartlett (Stephenson I),246 the Supreme Court of
North Carolina reversed its long-standing precedent of abstaining
from redistricting disputes on grounds of justiciability and entered the
239. See ELAINE F. MARSHALL, N.C. SEC’Y OF STATE, NORTH CAROLINA MANUAL
2001–2002, at 409–10 [hereinafter 2001 MANUAL] (listing the membership of the North
Carolina Senate as 15 Republicans and 37 Democrats in 2001); id. at 473–76 (listing the
membership of the North Carolina House of Representatives as 57 Republicans and 67
Democrats in 2001).
240. 507 U.S. 25 (1993).
241. Id. at 32–34.
242. See 2001 MANUAL, supra note 239, at 186 (listing Democratic Governor Michael
Easley); id. at 409–10 (listing political makeup of the North Carolina Senate); id. at 473–76
(listing political makeup of the North Carolina House of Representatives); id. at 637–43
(listing Supreme Court of North Carolina justices). For a description of the political
makeup of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in 2002, see infra note 249.
243. See Stephenson v. Bartlett, 180 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781 (E.D.N.C. 2001).
244. See id.
245. Stephenson v. Bartlett (Stephenson I), 355 N.C. 354, 359–60, 562 S.E.2d 377, 382
(2002), stay denied, 525 U.S. 1301, aff’d, 357 N.C. 301, 582 S.E.2d 247 (2003).
246. 355 N.C. 354, 562 S.E.2d 377 (2002).
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political thicket.247 This decision established redistricting standards,
under which the legislative branch must decennially draft electoral
districts that satisfy the requirements of both federal and state
constitutional law.248 The Supreme Court of North Carolina, at the
time composed of five Republican-affiliated justices and two
Democratic, approved a court-drawn plan for the 2002 elections.249
This plan, drafted by a single judge in lieu of the legislature’s plan,
was the result of preliminary relief in Stephenson I and far more
favorable to Republican candidates.250
In decisions following Stephenson I, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina established a state constitutional standard by which the
harmonizing of federal and state law should be conducted.251 This
litigation was to underscore the problem for the Democratic
legislature that a Republican judiciary could create. If the Republican
Party was in ascendency, what could happen to the overwhelmingly
Democratic trial bench or possibly improve the party’s ability to
compete in judicial elections? The solution, as explained hereinafter,
was to expand nonpartisan elections to the appellate bench and
publicly fund the elections.
Given the results of the Stephenson litigation and the potential
rising cost of judicial campaigns, the legislature sought a solution to
moderate both high costs and the partisanship of the judiciary. A
logical solution would have been to adopt merit proposals giving the
governor control over judicial appointments for the remainder of the
decade. However, this alternative was not politically possible because
the majority did not have the three-fifths of votes necessary to submit
a constitutional amendment for referendum, even if all Democrats
voted for it.252 Thus, the North Carolina Bar Association and other
groups interested in a merit selection plan came to the legislature with

247. Id. at 358–63, 375, 562 S.E.2d at 381–85, 392.
248. Id. at 362–63, 375, 562 S.E.2d at 384–85, 392.
249. Id. at 385, 562 S.E.2d at 398; SCOTT GAYLORD & JOSHUA DAVEY, THE FED. SOC’Y
FOR LAW & PUB. POLICY STUDIES, THE NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT: A SPECIAL
ISSUE REPORT 3 (2008), available at http://thehill.com/sites/default/files/federalistsociety
_ncspecialissuereport_0.pdf. In April 2002, the five Republican justices on the court were
Lake, Orr, Wainwright, Edmunds, and Martin, and the two Democrats were Parker and
Butterfield. 2001 MANUAL, supra note 239, at 637–43.
250. Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 386.
251. Stephenson v. Bartlett (Stephenson II), 357 N.C. 301, 305–14, 582 S.E.2d 247, 249–
54 (2003).
252. See 2001 MANUAL, supra note 239, at 409–10.
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the next best alternative, the Judicial Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(“JCRA”).253
A. The Judicial Campaign Reform Act of 2002
Adoption of the JCRA was motivated by a mix of reasons. Some
observers suggested that the JCRA was designed to reverse the
electoral trend that favored Republican candidates in the elections
between 1994 and 2000.254 If so, the North Carolina General
Assembly’s partisan interest in judicial election reform was not
unique to North Carolina. According to one observer, in states where
party parity was a political reality, the majority party was often willing
to sacrifice short-term political advantage in the control of courts in
favor of a long-term goal of maintaining incumbents of the majority
party.255
At the time of its adoption, the support for the JCRA appears to
fit this pattern. In the final reading in the house, all of the Democrats,
and only one Republican, supported the bill.256 In the final reading in
the senate, the vote was thirty-four to twelve, with all of the
Democrats supporting the bill and only two Republicans voting in
favor of it.257 The political landscape could hardly have been worse for
Democratic interests after the election of 2002, and any change would
have been for the better insofar as their partisan interests were
concerned.
Nevertheless, the legislature’s concern over the cost of judicial
elections seems factually based. The trend of increasing expenditures
in judicial elections was well documented in other states prior to and
during the 1990s. For example, in 1999, the ABA Standing
Committee on Judicial Independence established the ABA

253. Act of Oct. 10, 2002, ch. 509, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 615 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163).
254. See, e.g., John Davis, NC Supreme Court: 4 of 7 Seats Up in 2014. Rule #5: Lose the
Courts, Lose the War, JOHN DAVIS CONSULTING (Feb. 10, 2014), http:// www
.johndavisconsulting.com/2013/02/10/nc-supreme-court-4-of-7-seats-up-in-2014-rule-5-losethe-courts-lose-the-war/.
255. F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning About Judicial Independence: Institutional Change
in the State Courts, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 431, 460 (2004).
256. House of Representatives Roll-Call Transcript for S.B. 1054, N.C. GEN.
ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/voteHistory/RollCallVoteTranscript.pl
?sSession=2001&sChamber=H&RCS=1854 (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (reporting that the
house vote was fifty-seven to fifty-four with nine excused absences).
257. Id.

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1825 (2015)

2015]

ELECTIONS & JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

1863

Commission on Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns.258 The
commission recommended that judicial elections be financed with
public funds in states that select judges by contested elections.259 The
commission made this recommendation because of “the perceived
impropriety associated with judicial candidates accepting private
contributions from individuals and organizations interested in the
outcomes of cases those candidates may later decide.”260
Contributing to the perceived need for judicial reform was the
United States Supreme Court decision on judicial campaign speech in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.261 The Court held the
“announce” clause of the Minnesota canons of judicial conduct
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds.262 This canon had
previously hindered judicial candidates from announcing their
positions on public policy issues that may come before them for
consideration.263 Opening the doors to debate public issues placed
judges in roles more familiar to aspirants to office in municipal
elections or the nonpartisan election of superior court judges.264
As enacted, the JCRA replaced partisan elections with an open
primary system and limited the nonpartisan general election to two
contestants.265 All voters could participate in the primaries regardless
of party affiliation.266 The JCRA also introduced reform to judicial
campaign donations. Prior to its adoption, donors could contribute up
to $4,000 to judicial candidates in each election cycle (primary and
general).267 Under the JCRA, the maximum allowable contribution to
any one judicial candidate was reduced to $1,000 for nonparticipating
candidates and $500 for candidates who participated in the
program.268 Finally, the JCRA provided for a voter guide to be

258. See COMM’N ON PUB. FIN. OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS, AM. BAR. ASS’N
STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL
CAMPAIGNS, at viii (2002).
259. See id. at 30.
260. Id.
261. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
262. Id. at 787–88.
263. Id. at 787 (providing that prior to White, Minnesota’s “announce
clause . . . place[d] most subjects of interest to the voters off limits”).
264. J. Christopher Heagarty, North Carolina in the Post White Decision World: Where
We Are, How We Got There, and Where To Go Next, 3 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 109, 120
(2004).
265. See Act of Oct. 10, 2002, ch. 158, § 7, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 615, 626 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-322 (2012)).
266. Id.
267. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278 (2000).
268. § 2, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws at 621 (setting the private contribution limit at $1,000).
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distributed to all voters in the primary and general election.269 The
guide would contain information on all judicial candidates and would
be edited by the state elections board staff.270 All candidates, both
participating and nonparticipating, would be eligible to place
information in this program.271
In order to qualify for public financing, a candidate first needed
to file a declaration of intent to participate in the program.272 In this
declaration, a candidate pledged not to spend more than $10,000 in
private funds to raise qualifying funds,273 which are discussed below.
The pledge could be made as early as September 1 of the year prior to
the election year.274 In addition, the candidate pledged to abide by the
administrative rules published by the state board of elections and
promised to spend only public funds and qualifying donations in the
general election.275
The $10,000 maximum on private funds was considered seed
money and was allowed to come from any source.276 After raising the
seed money, a candidate seeking to qualify for public financing was to
raise certain “qualifying contributions.”277 To meet the requirements
of “qualifying contributions,” the candidate had to raise a minimum
of thirty times the filing fee for candidacy for the office.278 A
requirement of the fundraising was that funds had to come from at
least 350 donors, ensuring a broad base of support.279 The JCRA also
added a maximum cap for these funds of sixty times the filing fee.280 If
these requirements were met, then the candidate would be entitled to
receive public funds.281 The amounts varied. For example, $144,000 in
public campaign funds would be available for candidates for the state
court of appeals, and up to $216,675 for candidates for chief justice of
the supreme court.282 These amounts were computed based on a
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.64 (2014)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id., 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws at 618; see CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, PUBLIC
CAMPAIGN FINANCING: NORTH CAROLINA JUDICIARY 1 (2009), available at http://
research.policyarchive.org/20313.pdf.
277. Act of Oct. 10, 2002, ch. 158, § 1, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 615, 616 (repealed 2013).
278. Id.
279. Id., 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws at 617–18.
280. Id., 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws at 616.
281. Id., 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws at 617–18.
282. These numbers were obtained by multiplying court of appeals candidate filing fees
by 125 and supreme court candidate fees by 175. See id., 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws at 620.
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formula dependent upon the filing fee for the office sought and
remained static.283
Finally, as originally envisioned, the program provided for rescue
funds for publicly funded candidates who were outspent by lastminute “surprise attacks.”284 This provision intended to remedy the
situation where a nonfunded candidate or an “independent
committee” spends in excess of the public funds allocated to a
qualified candidate.285 After the JCRA, the state board of elections
was authorized to distribute rescue funds to candidates to meet this
challenge.286
At the time of its enactment the JCRA was seen as a panacea for
increasing relative judicial independence by its sponsors.
Unfortunately, the Act did not enjoy wide bipartisan support. Key
features necessary for its success would ultimately be undone by both
the United States Supreme Court287 and political winds at home.288
Nevertheless, it did improve the competitiveness of elections and
placed candidates at parity in funding.
B.

Nonpartisan Elections 2004 to 2012

After the JCRA was enacted, the judicial elections of 2004 were
the first to employ the public financing mechanism and eliminate
party affiliation on the ballot. These elections were marked by several
practical complications that were not anticipated by the drafters.
First, the JRCA was a popular program; many judicial candidates
participated in the program and were successful in raising the
qualifying funds. This popularity likely increased the need for funding
resources beyond what the drafters had anticipated. Secondly, the rise
of outside money began shortly after the public funding took effect as
independent expenditure committees sought to influence the election
of judges though third-party ads, diluting the effect of public
283. Id., 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws at 619–20. The public funding program was later
expanded to include some council of state offices in a similar program entitled “Clean
Elections,” but it has since been repealed. See Current Operations and Capital
Improvements Appropriations Act of 2013, ch. 21, § 21.1, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 965, 1325
(providing that the North Carolina Public Campaign Fund is eliminated).
284. § 1, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws at 620–21.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. __, 131 S.
Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011) (holding matching funds unconstitutional).
288. See Adam Smith, North Carolina Legislature Repeals Popular ‘Voter Owned
Elections’ Program, HUFFINGTON POST (July 26, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/adam-smith/nc-campaign-finance_b_3660472.html (citing the desire to have “voters to
count less and money to count more” as a reason for its repeal).
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financing. Third, the JRCA program required flexibility in its
administration, which was not anticipated by the drafters.
Among the successful candidates for public office during the sixyear period in which the program was available, in seventy-three
contested elections, forty of the candidates qualified for public
financing; in all contested elections, only two candidates who did not
use the program were successful.289 Given that the required threshold
amount of fundraising was small, the program was very popular
among the candidates.
There were two legal challenges involving the JCRA. The first
was a federal challenge on First Amendment grounds, brought by
Barbara Jackson and W. Russell Duke.290 Duke and now-Justice
Jackson argued that the JCRA was unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds because the act imposed campaign disclosure
requirements on nonparticipating candidates.291 The case was
dismissed.292 The second challenge in 2006 involved the
administration of rescue funds and the consequences of candidates
coordinating with third-party campaign groups.293 In the 2006
campaign, Robin Hudson was the beneficiary of assistance from a
“fair judges” independent committee, which may have contributed to
her narrow win over her colleague Judge Ann Marie Calabria.294
Calabria sought a stay of certification of the election until the
challenge could be resolved, but this effort was also unsuccessful.295
However, the influx of third-party money was only beginning in 2006.
In the election of 2012, incumbent Justice Paul Newby ran for
reelection and was challenged by court of appeals Judge Sam J. Ervin,

289. Participation in the Judicial Campaign Program: Profile in the Top Courts for
2011, DEMOCRACY N.C. (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.democracy-nc.org/downloads
/JudicialPublicFinPRDec2010.pdf. Supreme Court Justice Mark Martin did not seek to
enroll in the program, and court of appeals Judge Rick Elmore won the 2010 election but
failed to qualify for the program. Id.
290. Jackson v. Leake, 476 F. Supp. 2d 515, 518 (E.D.N.C. 2006).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 530.
293. See Verified Complaint, Calabria v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 640 S.E.2d 61
(N.C. Super. 2006) (No. 06CVS17353), 2006 WL 6627503 (denying Calabria’s request for
rescue funds after Robin Hudson received nearly $300,000 in funds from Fairjudges.net).
294. See id.; see also Mark Binker, Big Business Spends to Unseat NC Supreme Court
Justice Hudson, WRAL (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.wral.com/big-business-spends-tounseat-nc-supreme-court-justice-hudson/13603252/ (“In 2006, Fairjudges.net, a group
backed by Democrats, spent more than $250,000 on advertisements on behalf of judicial
candidates, including Hudson.”).
295. Calabria, 640 S.E.2d at 61.
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IV.296 Justice Newby won reelection.297 Both candidates were the
object of independent expenditure committees, and although outside
spending is hard to calculate, the spending in support of Justice
Newby was estimated to exceed $3 million while the outside spending
for Judge Ervin was only $300,000.298 Both candidates also qualified
for funding, and by this time “rescue funding” had been outlawed by
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona Free
Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett.299 Similar outside
funds were spent in 2014,300 but this was after the public financing
program ended.
The program also faced unexpected challenges from unexpected
circumstances. Following Justice Orr’s resignation in the summer of
2004, Paul M. Newby, an Assistant United States Attorney, won
election after besting seven other candidates for the seat, including
appointed Justice James Wynn.301 Here, the program had to address
the problem of funding eight candidates for one seat when it
appeared that more than two candidates may be eligible for public
funds.302
296. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 2012 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS [hereinafter
2012 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS], available at http://www.ncsbe.gov/ncsbe/Elections
/Election-Results-Display?ED1=11xx06xx2012&EL1=GENERAL&YR1=2012&CR1=A
(last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
297. See id. (displaying the results of the election between incumbent Newby and
Erwin for the “Newby Seat—NC Supreme Court Associate Justice”).
298. ALICIA BANNON ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, 2011–12,
at 11 (Laura Kinney & Peter Hardin eds., 2013), available at http://newpoliticsreport.org
/content/uploads/JAS-NewPolitics2012-Online.pdf. (“Driving this election spending was
the newly created North Carolina Judicial Coalition, a conservative Super PAC that spent
an estimated $2.9 million in TV advertisements promoting Newby and ranked as the
fourth highest spender nationally in 2011–12. Independent spending on behalf of Ervin
came mainly from a group called N.C. Citizens for Protecting Our Schools and totaled
some $270,000. The candidates raised a combined $173,011 and benefitted from $480,020
in public financing.”).
299. 564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011).
300. Outside funds were particularly present during the 2014 judicial primaries. See
generally Erik Eckholm, Outside Spending Enters Arena of Judicial Races, N.Y. TIMES
(May
5,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/us/politics/outside-spendingtransforms-supreme-court-election-in-north-carolina.html?_r=0
(describing
the
significant sums spent in the 2014 North Carolina judicial primaries, much by outside
independent groups).
301. See Michael Cromwell, That Court of Appeals Ballot, N.C. CRIM. L. BLOG (Aug.
14, 2014), http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/that-court-of-appeals-ballot/ (“Paul Newby led
with 583,000 votes out of almost 2.6 million cast and got a full eight-year term.”);
DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE NEW POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004, at 22 (Jesse Rutledge ed., 2004), available at http://www
.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_10569.pdf.
302. See Results of the Public Financing Program in NC Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court Races, DEMOCRACY N.C., http://nc-democracy.org/reports
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In 2013, both the general assembly and the governor’s office
became Republican controlled for the first time since the 1800s,303 and
the general assembly abolished publicly financed elections.304 The
voter guide and nonpartisan elections are the only remnants of the
JCRA remaining, and North Carolina now has a system of privately
financed nonpartisan elections.305
III. SUCCESSES OF THE NONPARTISAN, PUBLICLY FINANCED
SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
When a jurisdiction determines to elect judges for terms rather
than appoint them during good behavior, it makes a policy decision
that judges are accountable to the public. This policy choice makes
the judiciary relatively less independent. The enactment of the JCRA
was an effort to make the best of judicial elections and to relieve
judges from partisan political pressure. The JCRA achieved some
measure of success.
A. Perception of Fairness
At the time the JCRA was enacted, proponents of public funding
contended that the purpose of the Act was “to ensure the fairness of
democratic elections in North Carolina and to protect the
constitutional rights of voters and candidates from the detrimental
effects of increasingly large amounts of money being raised and spent
to influence the outcome of elections.”306 The potential for corruption
or the appearance thereof is especially problematic in judicial
elections, since impartiality is uniquely important to the integrity and
/researchreports/ResultsPublicFinancingSupremeCourtRaces.pdf (last visited Aug. 17,
2015) (noting that the eight candidates in the race for Newby’s seat “were offered a
limited amount of the total public financing package”).
303. Nia-Malika Henderson, Groups Use ‘War on Women’ Strategy To Bolster Hagan
in N.C. Senate Race, WASH. POST (June 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs
/she-the-people/wp/2014/06/18/groups-use-war-on-women-strategy-to-bolster-hagan-in-nc-senate-race/.
304. See Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2013,
ch. 21, § 21.1, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 965, 1325 (providing that the North Carolina Public
Campaign Fund is eliminated and noting that the Judicial Voter Guide requirement will
be repealed upon exhaustion of funds for publication of the Guide); see also Voter
Information Verification Act, ch. 381, § 1, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 1505, 1551 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.23 (2013)) (eliminating the $50 annual attorney’s
fee used to fund the Judicial Voter Guide).
305. See supra notes 265–71 and accompanying text.
306. Act of Oct. 10, 2002, ch. 158, § 1, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 615, 615 (repealed 2013)
(providing that the North Carolina Public Campaign Fund is eliminated and noting that
the judicial voter guide requirement will be repealed upon exhaustion of funds for
publication of the guide).
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credibility of the courts. Polls conducted immediately before the
JCRA was enacted suggested that the privately financed system of
judicial elections was not perceived as “fair” because attorneys and
other litigants funded the elections of candidates by whom their legal
claims would be decided.307 The mechanics of the public financing
scheme dramatically changed this reality so far as contributions to
candidates are concerned.
B.

Reduced Emphasis on Private Funding of Judicial Campaigns

Against a “fairness standard,” empirical research is difficult to
measure because fairness is subjective. Because public funds were
substituted for private funds in the mechanism established by the
JCRA, there has been an obvious shift in the percentage of funds
provided by special interests, such as the legal profession. For
example, according to North Carolina Voters for Clean Elections,
“[i]n the 2002 election, 73% of the nonfamily funds raised by
appellate judicial candidates came from attorneys, attorney groups,
business PACs and special interests that often appear in court[, but]
[t]hat figure dropped to 14% after public financing became an
option.”308 Furthermore, the public financing program had a
requirement that a candidate show broad base support by obtaining
at least 350 contributors.309 Thus, candidates for office had twin goals:
to meet the threshold of funds and to do so from at least 350
donors.310 As a result, contributions from small donors benefited the
candidates even after the threshold amount was raised.
Comparing these percentages remains ephemeral because the
contribution limits for public versus private funding are very
different. The maximum private contribution limits changed from
$4,000 in 2002 to $1,000 in 2004.311 Thus while the amount of judicial
contributions from attorneys and special-interest groups may be

307. Poll: Voters Lack Information on Elected Officials, Fear Influence of Money over
Politics, Support Reform, N.C. CTR. FOR VOTER EDUC. (June 23, 2005), http://ncvotered
.com/research/2005/6_23_05_voters_lack_info.php (“North Carolina voters believe money
influences political behavior and keeps good people from running from office.”).
308. NC Judicial Public Financing: A Success Story, N.C. VOTERS FOR CLEAN
ELECTIONS, http://www.ncvce.org/content/nc-judicial-public-financing-success-story (last
visited Aug. 17, 2015).
309. See § 1, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws at 618.
310. Id.
311. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278 (2000) (providing that the private
contribution limit was $4,000), with § 2, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws at 621 (setting the private
contribution limit at $1,000).
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reduced, outside spending was not entirely eliminated under the
publicly funded campaign system.
C.

Equality of Funding

If fairness is measured in terms of equality of access to campaign
funds, then the program was generally a success as measured by the
number of candidates that qualified for public funding. The following
chart shows the participation of candidates in the fund and their
success in qualifying:
Table 1. Candidates Qualifying for Public Funding312

Year

Total
Candidates313

Declared
and
Qualified

Declared but
Did Not
Qualify

No Declaration or
Ran Unopposed

2004

16

12

2

2

2006

12

8

1

3

2008

13

11

0

2

2010

22

8

5

9

Total

65

39

8

16

During the life of the program, two candidates opted out of the
program and successfully raised more campaign money than that
which would have been provided by the public funding program. In
2006, Justice Mark Martin was opposed by attorney Rachel Lea
Hunter.314 Neither Hunter nor Martin participated in the public
funding program. Justice Martin listed receipts of $446,493.89 in

312. The list of candidates who enrolled and who qualified for public funds has been
compiled by Democracy North Carolina. See Special-Interest Funding Declines in State
Court Elections as 77% of the Top Judges Qualify for Public Funds, DEMOCRACY N.C.
(Dec.
21,
2010),
http://www.democracy-nc.org/downloads
/JudicialPublicFinPRDec2010.pdf (listing “Who Enrolled & Who Qualified for Public
Funds, by Election Cycle” from 2004 to 2010).
313. The total number of candidates represents the number of candidates on the ballot
for appellate court positions in the general election.
314. See N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 2006 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS
[hereinafter 2006 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS], available at ftp:// alt.ncsbe.gov/data
/ElectResults/2006_11_07/20061107_results_statewide.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
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2006,315 far above the $201,775 that would have been provided by
public funding for supreme court races that year.316 Also in 2006,
Justice Sarah Parker was opposed by Judge Russell Duke for Chief
Justice.317 Justice Parker participated in the program, but Judge Duke
did not. Judge Duke raised $368,502—exceeding the $201,775 he
would have been allotted through public funding.318 Because Judge
Duke raised more money than the fund-raising limit that Justice
Parker accepted through the public funding program, the program
distributed $155,000 in rescue funds to Justice Parker.319
D. Increased Competition in Judicial Elections
If fairness is measured in competitive elections for judicial office,
then the program is at least as successful as the privately financed
partisan system. In the period of elections from 2002 to 2012, only two
appellate court candidates have run unopposed, John Martin in
2008320 and Sanford Steelman in 2010.321 Winning margins have also
been narrow, with many contests decided by less than ten percent.322

315. See N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE
REPORT, REELECT JUSTICE MARK MARTIN COMMITTEE, available at http:// app.ncsbe
.gov/webapps/cf_rpt_search_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=84987&TP=SUM (last visited
Aug. 17, 2015).
316. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, North Carolina Right to Life Comm. Fund for
Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2008) (No. 08-120), 2008 WL
2900047, at *4, available at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy
/Democracy/DukevLeakeCertPetition.pdf.
317. See 2006 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS, supra note 314.
318. See N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE
REPORT, RUSTY DUKE COMMITTEE, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt
_search_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=84746&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
319. See Philip G. Rogers et al., Voter-Owned Elections in North Carolina: Public
Financing of Campaigns, POPULAR GOV’T, Winter 2009, at 30, 36–37.
320. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 2008 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS [hereinafter
2008 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS], available at http://results.enr.clarityelections.com
/NC/7937/21334/en/summary.html# (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
321. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 2010 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS [hereinafter
2010 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS], available at http://results.enr.clarityelections.com
/NC/22580/41687/en/summary.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
322. For example, in the 2012 judicial election cycle, two appellate court seats were
decided by less than 10%, the Newby/Ervin race for supreme court had a 3.8% margin and
the Dillon/Thigpen race for court of appeals had a 5.48% margin. Similarly, in 2010, the
Bob C. Hunter/Jackson race for supreme court was decided by a 3.72% margin. 2012
GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS, supra note 296; 2010 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS,
supra note 321.
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Relative Judicial Independence as Measured by Incumbent
Success

As discussed at the outset of this Article, one measure of the
strength of relative judicial independence is the frequency with which
elected incumbent judges remain on the bench.323 During the period
from 1994 to 2002, two out of four of the elected incumbents retained
their seats in elections for the supreme court.324 In the eight-year
period from 2004 to 2014 all four of the previously elected, incumbent
North Carolina Supreme Court justices retained their seats.325
Therefore, if fairness can be measured by “relative judicial
independence,” then the public financing scheme was a success. The
measure of this success is to see how many elected “incumbent”
judges are retained in offices. North Carolina’s nonpartisan system
seems to have assisted incumbents in retaining their own seats.
However, open seats have been competitive. This pattern suggests a
public satisfaction with incumbents that have been elected. Arguably,
if someone is experienced in a job, then he or she should be
retained.326 In other words, the challenger should bear the burden of
proving that an incumbent should be unseated.
IV. FAILURES OF THE NONPARTISAN, PUBLICLY FINANCED SYSTEM
OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
While there are obvious successes of the JCRA, there are also
practical problems in its administration. Most of these failures are a
result of a system that reduces most issues to political calculation. The
judiciary now finds itself embroiled in the effects of that system. This
Section discusses five issues associated with judicial elections that the
JCRA did not effectively resolve: (1) the prevalence of “outside”
money in judicial races, (2) the inadequacy of funds provided to

323. See Tiede, supra note 16, 143–44 (“The logic is that the longer judges hold office,
the less likely they will be concerned about job security and thus the more likely they will
make decisions based on the law rather than on personal career goals.”).
324. See Beyle, supra note 223, at 10 tbl.1.
325. See 2012 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS, supra note 296; Biography of Associate
Justice Edmunds, NCCOURTS.ORG, https://appellate.nccourts.org/Bios/index.php?c=1&Name
=Edmunds (last visited Sept. 3, 2015); Biography of Associate Justice Hudson,
NCCOURTS.ORG, https://appellate.nccourts.org/Bios/index.php?c=1&Name=Hudson (last
visited Sept. 3, 2015); Biography of Chief Justice Martin, NCCOURTS.ORG,
https://appellate.nccourts.org/Bios/index.php?c=1&Name=Martin (last visited Sept. 3,
2015).
326. Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77
JUDICATURE 306, 307 (1994) (“An overwhelming 86.5 percent of judges surveyed favor
retaining retention elections.”).
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candidates by the public financing system, (3) low electoral
participation in judicial races, (4) a lack of meaningful voter
information on judicial candidates, and (5) the influence of partisan
politics in judicial elections.
A. “Outside” Money
Equality of funding among candidates under the JCRA did not
equate with a lack of influence from outside money on judicial
elections in North Carolina. Still, while it was legal to do so, rescue
funds were awarded to candidates for judicial office to combat
outside funding by private groups in support of publicly funded
candidates.327 For instance, Justice Parker was eligible to receive
rescue funds in 2004 in her contest with Judge Duke.328 Candidates in
the 2008 election received rescue funds, as did candidates in 2010.329
Public funding and rescue funds are in theory an answer to
outside money. But in practice they lack the flexibility an outside
group can use to sway an electorate with last-minute advertising. The
Brennan Center reported that, in 2004, independent groups
purchased no television ads.330 Similarly, the Center did not uncover
any other active committees spending money independent of
candidates’ campaigns for that year.331 Nevertheless, in 2006,
Fairjudges.net, a Democrat-funded campaign organization, organized
an independent expenditure committee to assist the candidacy of
Judge Robin Hudson and three other judicial candidates.332

327. See Act of Oct. 10, 2002, ch. 158, § 1, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 615, 620 (repealed
2013).
328. See Justin Moore, The Battleground 2012: The Public Financing of Judicial
Candidates in North Carolina after Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett, ST. ELECTIONS
(Nov. 6, 2012), http://electls.blogs.wm.edu/2012/11/06/the-battleground-2012-the-publicfinancing-of-judicial-candidates-in-north-carolina-after-arizona-free-enterprise-v-bennett/.
329. See G. ALAN TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR 160 (2012) (noting that rescue
funds were disbursed to Robert Edmunds in the 2008 election); see generally
DEMOCRACY N.C., SPECIAL-INTEREST FUNDING DECLINES IN STATE COURT
ELECTIONS (2010) (documenting rescue funds in the 2010 elections).
330. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 301, at 6 fig.5.
331. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 298, at 6 (finding that political parties did not
spend any money on North Carolina judicial elections independently of supreme court
candidates’ campaigns in 2011–2012 election year).
332. See FairJudges.Net: Top Contributors (2006), OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.
opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtedetail_contribs.php?cycle=2006&ein=205204162 (last visited
Aug. 17, 2015) (showing the Democratic Party of North Carolina as the organization’s
largest contributor).
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Fairjudges.net expended $270,470 in this effort.333 Outside money did
in fact flow to judicial candidates—particularly Democrats—during
the time period the JCRA was in effect. Between 2000 and 2009, the
North Carolina Democratic Party made contributions to judicial
candidates totaling $196,359.334 In contrast, the Republican Party
spent $16,000,335 which was less than the $20,000 spent by the other
“top” spender, the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers.336 The
Brennan Center suggests that this pattern of independent expenditure
in North Carolina is likely to be repeated in successive judicial
elections, as has occurred in other states.337
Thus, the public financing program was not successful in curbing
the influence of outside spending. Furthermore, in 2010 and 2011, the
United States Supreme Court issued two opinions making it easier for
“outside” money to flow into judicial campaigns. Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission338 prohibited state governments from
restricting political independent expenditures by corporations,
associations, or labor unions.339 This decision was followed by Arizona
Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, which
eliminated state rescue funds (called “matching funds” in Arizona)
from being expended to combat outside spending by third-party
groups.340 These United States Supreme Court decisions have largely
crippled campaign reforms, such as public funding for judicial
candidates. Public funding in the United States is rare and is premised
upon the belief that it will eliminate or minimize the adverse effects
of private money entering the public discussion.341 A key ingredient of
the public funding mechanism is the ability of a candidate who relies
on public funding to be able to timely respond to privately funded
333. See JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE NEW POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2006, at 21 fig.13 (Jesse Rutledge ed., 2006), available at http://www
.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_48787.pdf.
334. See JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE NEW POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000–2009, at 82 (Charles Hall ed., 2010), available at http://www
.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASNPJEDecadeONLINE_8E7FD3FEB83E3.pdf.
335. Id. (providing that the North Carolina Republican Party spent $16,000 on
candidate contributions for appellate judges between the years 2000 and 2009).
336. Id.
337. Id. at 36.
338. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
339. Id. at 319.
340. Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct.
2806, 2813 (2011).
341. See Public Financing, JUST. AT STAKE, http://www.justiceatstake.org/issues/state
_court_issues/public-financing/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (“In order to help combat the
influence of special interest money on their judicial elections, two states have adopted
permanent public financing programs.”).
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attack ads. Without rescue funds, one is unable to raise money in a
timely fashion to respond to private funds.
B.

Inadequacy of Funds

Another criticism of the public funding mechanism is it became
inadequate over time. Costs of campaigning have risen in North
Carolina due to the state’s competitiveness in nonjudicial elections,
which drives the cost of television advertising up. In 2014, for
example, the United States Senate candidates Kay Hagan and Thom
Tillis spent more than $70 million on statewide television advertising
alone.342 These amounts dwarf the public funding amounts that would
be provided by the act.343 These funds not only crowd out judicial
candidates from obtaining favorable ad placement, but also increase
the cost by creating scarcity of television time in the period after
voting begins. Furthermore, the elimination of rescue funds344 and the
rise of super PACs and 527-group advertisers345 has allowed public
interest groups, like the Advocates for Justice or the chambers of
commerce, to further enhance their favored candidates’ chances of
winning.
As a result, the state public funding mechanisms suffer from the
same inadequacies as presidential public funding. If all candidates in a
race are participating in the fund and are equally limited, then there is
less of a problem. However as discussed above, where independent
expenditures enter the contest, the inadequacy of funds is
problematic.
Both candidates for whom outside funding was heavily
employed—Robin Hudson in 2006 and Paul Newby in 2012—won in
close races.346 Yet it is empirically difficult to measure whether the
outcome of the election would have been different had the spending
342. This money was spent by both the candidates themselves and their PACs. See
Jason deBruyn, How Much Did Hagan and Tillis Spend on Their U.S. Senate Campaigns
in NC?, TRIANGLE BUS. J. (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/news/2014
/11/05/hagan-tillis-us-senate-campaign-spending-nc.html.
343. See supra Section II.A.
344. See Bennett, 564 U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2828.
345. For a discussion of the effect of PACs and 527-group advertisers on judicial
elections, see Chris Kromm, 5 Players Behind the Big Money Attacks in NC Supreme
Court Election, INST. FOR S. STUD. (May 2, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://www.southernstudies
.org/2014/05/5-players-behind-the-big-money-attacks-in-nc-supre.html.
346. See JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 333, at 11 n.8 (describing a 2006
advertisement run by Fairjudges.net in support of Hudson); 2012 GENERAL ELECTION
RESULTS, supra note 296 (showing Newby’s election results); 2006 GENERAL ELECTION
RESULTS, supra note 314 (showing Hudson’s election results); Eckholm, supra note 300
(describing outside spending entering the Newby election).
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not taken place. In the 2006 election, Robin Hudson won by about
20,000 votes cast, or by 50.1% of the vote.347 The failure of the state
board of elections to distribute rescue funds may have made a
difference.348 In the 2012 election, it is clear that Justice Newby’s
name recognition benefited from the nearly $2.9 million poured into
the campaign.349 Justice Newby won by 133,099 votes, receiving 51.9%
of the vote.350
Given that the disparity in spending on behalf of the two
candidates did not result in a similar disparity in outcome in the vote,
one has to question if large amounts of spending in judicial races
reaches a point of diminishing returns. Some election observers have
opined that outside spending may have a marginally decreasing effect
on the electorate as funding passes a certain threshold.351 But, these
observations do not diminish the effect of campaign spending on
elections. Instead, they point to the failure of public funding to stem
the increase in campaign spending by outside groups.
C.

Electoral Participation

The biggest disappointment of public financing of judicial
elections is the measurable lack of participation in judicial elections
conducted in the nonpartisan context. “Roll-off,” or undervoting, is a
political phenomenon whereby voters cast ballots in prestige races
and avoid making decisions in lower information contests.352 In
multiple-vote U.S. ballots, “voter roll-off” is calculated by subtracting
the number of votes cast for a “down-ballot” office, such as mayor,
from the number of votes cast for a “top-of-the-ballot” office, such as
president.353 When the election jurisdiction does not report voter
turnout, roll-off can be used as a proxy for residual votes.354 Thus,
347. See 2006 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS, supra note 314.
348. Hudson’s 2006 opponent, Ann Marie Calabria, sought rescue funds from the state
board of elections after the FairJudges.net ad ran, but the board refused. See Calabria v.
N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 198 N.C. App. 550, 559, 680 S.E.2d 738, 746 (2009).
349. BANNON ET AL., supra note 298, at 4.
350. See 2012 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS, supra note 296.
351. See John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L.
REV. 591, 606 (2005) (“Social science studies have shown that, once a requisite minimum
has been collected, money in a political war chest does not substantially affect election
outcomes.”).
352. See Matthew J. Streb et al., Voter Rolloff in a Low-Information Context: Evidence
from Intermediate Appellate Court Elections, 37 AM. POL. RES. 644, 647 (2009) (defining
ballot roll-off as “the percentage of the electorate casting votes for the major office on the
ballot who do not vote in each [intermediate appellate court] race”).
353. Id. at 657, 663 n.5.
354. Id. at 664. Residual votes are the total number of votes that are uncounted in an
election.

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1825 (2015)

2015]

ELECTIONS & JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

1877

some voters may only be interested in voting for the major offices
without bothering to vote down ballot, resulting in a partially valid
ballot.
If the JCRA truly achieved its goal of increasing electoral
participation, then roll-off should be measurably lower during the
years in which the JCRA was in effect. Bonneau and Hall
“compar[ed] average rates of ballot roll-off before and after the
[JCRA] reforms.”355 They found that voter participation sharply
decreased from 2000 to 2004, after the enactment of the JCRA, with
“far fewer voters participating in state supreme court elections after
the purported improvements in judicial selection relative to the
period immediately before the changes.”356

355. CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 112 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2009).
356. Id.
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Table 2. Undervote in N.C. Judicial Elections357

Turnout358

Top
Statewide
Judicial
Race359

Undervote

Under
-vote,
% of
Total

Lowest
Statewide
Judicial
Race360

Undervote

Under
-vote,
% of
Total

1992

2,611,850

2,419,438

192,412

7.37%

2,282,947

328,903

12.59%

1994

1,533,728

1,533,728

0

0.00%

1,464,209

69,519

4.53%

1996

2,513,357

2,380,910

132,447

5.27%

2,347,666

165,691

6.59%

1998

2,012,149

1,920,687

91,462

4.55%

1,824,783

187,366

9.31%

2000

3,015,964

2,828,859

187,105

6.20%

2,699,824

316,140

10.48%

2002

2,349,966

2,177,198

172,768

7.35%

2,128,901

221,065

9.41%

2004

3,551,675

2,710,260

841,415

23.69%

2,541,424

1,010,251

28.44%

2006

2,036,451

1,707,326

329,125

16.16%

1,546,172

490,279

24.08%

2008

4,354,052

3,092,764

1,261,288

28.97%

2,876,932

1,477,120

33.93%

2010

2,700,393

2,012,869

687,524

25.46%

1,778,349

922,044

34.14%

2012

4,542,488

3,510,025

1,032,463

22.73%

3,374,705

1,167,783

25.71%

Avg.

2,838,370

2,390,369

448,001

13.43%

2,260,537

577,833

18.11%

This drop in voter participation in judicial elections after the
JCRA may be explained in part by North Carolina’s reliance up until
2014 on “straight-ticket” balloting, which allowed voters to vote for
all party candidates with one vote.361 The following chart shows the

357. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, STATISTICS FOR PRESIDENTIAL AND NONPRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEARS 1972 TO 2012, available at https://www.ncsbe.gov/ncsbe
/voter-turnout (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
358. This figure represents the total of the largest statewide election.
359. This figure is the sum of votes in the highest voted judicial race.
360. This table uses only contested elections, so it does not include the smaller turnout
figures from uncontested races.
361. See Bob Hall, End of Straight-Ticket Voting in NC Tinged with Racial, Age Bias,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.newsobserver.com/2014/08/27
/4101329/end-of-straight-ticket-voting.html.
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number of voters who cast a straight-party ballot in 2008, 2010, and
2012 according to public records:
Table 3. Voters Casting Straight-Party Ballots by Party362
2008

2010

2012

Democratic

1,283,486

599,985

1,418,430

Republican

881,856

561,878

1,110,390

Libertarian

19,054

9,135

25,146

Prior to the JRCA, judicial candidates received the benefit of
straight-ticket votes because they were on a partisan ballot. After the
enactment of the JRCA, because judicial elections became
nonpartisan, the candidates lost that benefit. Nonpartisan races, such
as judicial races, are not automatically counted on a straight-ticket
ballot. Therefore one explanation of the drop in voting is that voters
do not continue to vote after casting a straight-party ballot.
A further explanation of reduction in votes in judicial races is
ballot design. If a race is a partisan race, it is placed at the top of
every ballot.363 Nonpartisan ballots, on the other hand, are listed at
the bottom of the ballot in North Carolina.364 A long ballot produces
voter fatigue where some voters stop after completing only some of
the ballot.365 This kind of roll-off was likely to occur when judicial
races were moved from near the top of the ballot in partisan elections
before 2002 to the bottom of ballots after 2002 with the passage of the
JCRA.366

362. 2008 GENERAL ELECTIONS RESULTS, supra note 320; 2010 GENERAL ELECTION
RESULTS, supra note 321; 2012 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS, supra note 296.
363. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-165.6(b)(3) (2014). For an example, see Lawrence Norden
& Margaret Chen, How Bad is North Carolina’s Ballot Flaw? The Numbers Say, Pretty
Bad, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 21, 2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog
/how-bad-north-carolina’s-ballot-flaw-numbers-say-pretty-bad (displaying PDF of a ballot
with partisan section at the top).
364. See sources cited supra note 363.
365. Elizabeth Garrett, The Law of Economics and Elections: The Law and Economics
of “Informed Voter” Ballot Notations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1533, 1579 (1999).
366. See supra Section II.A.

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1825 (2015)

1880

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

D. Voter Information and Campaign Advertising
North Carolina has a long ballot.367 An examination of ballot
position and the number of votes casts in any contest shows that as
one descends down ballot, the total votes counted declines.368 In
judicial races, each registered voter obtains a voter guide with
detailed information about the competing candidates. In other races,
the only official information distributed is name and party affiliation.
Thus, in the two systems we are comparing, the public does not
always resort to information available about judicial candidates to
make a decision about the choices offered. This phenomenon is not
limited to judges. Even if one were to get detailed information
regarding a candidate’s education and experience, evaluating the
information obtained is problematic. As a result many voters choose
not to vote in the race.369 Public opinion polls support the notion that
voters describe themselves as having little information on the judicial
candidates.370 Because of the difficulty of information evaluation and
the inability to rely on party cues, low information voters may decide
to vote on gender or name cues, or fail to vote entirely.
Voters generally do not vote randomly, even in low-information
elections.371 Although the extent to which voters take cues from ballot
information has not been studied in North Carolina judicial elections,
out of the nineteen nonpartisan appellate races that place one man
against one woman, women have won fifteen of those contests.372 The
367. Compare Sarah Wheaton, Comparing Ballot Lengths Around the Country, N.Y.
TIMES: THE CAUCUS (Feb. 6, 2013, 12:04 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02
/06/comparing-ballot-lengths-around-the-country/?_r=1 (indicating that the average state
ballot contains seventeen elective offices), with CONSOLIDATED 2014 SAMPLE BALLOT
PITT COUNTY, NC, NOV. 4, 2014, available at http://www.pittcountync.gov/depts/elections
/documents/sample-ballot.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (showing thirty-four elective
offices).
368. See Garrett, supra note 365, at 1579 (noting that “voter fatigue” can cause a voter
to stop voting for offices and questions before they reach the end of the ballot).
369. See generally id. (noting the probable effects of ballot notations).
370. See History of Reform Efforts: Opinion Polls and Surveys, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST.
COURTS (2002), http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/reform_efforts/opinion
_polls_surveys.cfm?state= (providing that, in North Carolina, “57% reported having little
or no information about judicial candidates in the last election”).
371. See generally Monika L. McDermott, Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information
Elections, 51 POL. RES. Q. 895 (1998) (noting earlier research establishing that voters use
party-identification and incumbency cues when voting in low-information elections and
arguing that voters also use gender and racial cues).
372. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 2004 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS, available at
http://www.ncsbe.gov/ncsbe/Elections/Election-Results-Display?ED1=11xx02xx2004
&EL1=GENERAL&YR1=2004&CR1=A (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (Sarah Parker,
Linda McGee, and Barbara Jackson defeated their male opponents); 2006 GENERAL
ELECTION RESULTS, supra note 314 (Sarah Parker and Patricia Timmons-Goodson
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Supreme Court of North Carolina went from six men and one woman
in 2002373 to four women and three men in the beginning of 2012.374
Similarly, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has gone from eleven
men and one woman in 1992 to seven women and eight men today.375
There is also evidence that voter information and partisan
judicial elections are affected by partisan sweeps in other branches of
government.376 For example, in 1994, Republicans swept the North
Carolina House of Representatives.377 Simultaneously, all four
Republican candidates for state appellate court seats won handily,
even though three of the four candidates were outspent by their
opponents.378 Partisan sweeps also sometimes indicate partisan
polarization. Particularly in communities like North Carolina, in
which most African-Americans are Democrats, partisan sweeps
would tend to indicate racial polarization.379 But, nonpartisan
elections have been remarkably free of both kinds of polarization. For
example, in winning elections in 2012, 2010, and 2008, some
Republican candidates obtained more than 30% of the black vote, a

defeated their male opponents while Rachel Lea Hunter did not); 2008 GENERAL
ELECTION RESULTS, supra note 320 (Jewel Ann Farlow, Cheri Beasley, and Linda
Stephens defeated their male opponents while Suzanne Reynolds and Kristin Ruth did
not); 2010 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS, supra note 321 (Barbara Jackson and Martha
Geer defeated their male opponents); 2012 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS, supra note
296 (Linda McGee and Wanda Bryant defeated their male opponents); N.C. STATE BD.
OF ELECTIONS, 2014 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS [hereinafter 2014 GENERAL
ELECTION RESULTS], available at http://enr.ncsbe.gov/ElectionResults/?election_dt=11/04
/2014&county_id=0&office=JUD&contest=0 (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (Robin Hudson,
Cheri Beasley, and Lucy Inman defeated their male opponents while Ola M. Lewis did
not).
373. See 2001 MANUAL, supra note 239, at 637–43.
374. ELAINE F. MARSHALL, N.C. SEC’Y OF STATE, NORTH CAROLINA MANUAL
2011–2012, at 489–96.
375. See NC Court of Appeals Judges Biographies, N.C. CT. SYS., http://appellate
.nccourts.org/Bios/?c=2 (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (listing the current members of the
North Carolina Court of Appeals).
376. See Trosch, supra note 230, at 209 (discussing the “sweep factor” of judicial
elections where judicial candidates benefit from the popularity of their party’s other
candidates for nonjudicial offices, as exemplified in North Carolina’s judicial elections in
1988 and 1994).
377. Dan Balz, After the Republican Sweep, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 1994), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/11/10/after-the-republican-sweep/7d5ffc363904-40c9-809a-2c18cd12d53e/.
378. Trosch, supra note 230, at 209.
379. DAVID A. BOSITIS, JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL & ECON. STUDIES, BLACKS &
THE 2012 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 3, 9 (2012), available at
http://jointcenter.org/sites/default/files/Blacks%20and%20the%202012%20Republican
%20National%20Convention.pdf.
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result that was not present in similar elections during the 1994–2002
period.380
Meanwhile, campaign advertising is used to inform voters about
candidates. The failure of the state to provide sufficient funds for
statewide coverage by television is theoretically offset by the judicial
voter guide, which the state board of elections has provided for all
voters since the enactment of the JCRA in 2004.381 Each voter in the
state receives a voter guide briefly describing the judicial contests in
the primary and general elections.382 The voter guide does not contain
partisan identification cues but does contain photographs,
biographical information, and nonpartisan endorsements.383 Although
edited by the staff at the state board of elections, candidates provide
the information.384 Thus, the voter guide identifies the name, race,
and gender of candidates, as well as other information that the
candidates consider persuasive. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of
the voter guide to the voters has not been empirically tested in North
Carolina. But voter roll-off suggests that voter guides may not be
particularly effective.385
E.

Partisanship

The final criticism of public financing is that it did not eliminate
partisanship in judicial elections, but simply moved the discussion
underground.386 In my experience, political parties generally endorse
their affiliates in the nonpartisan judicial races and help voters to
identify their affiliates through informational tools such as flyers at
polling places. As a result, candidates of both parties tend to garner
more votes in areas in which their affiliate parties hold a majority of
the electorate. Since it is very difficult for a statewide judicial
candidate to create a personal campaign network across the state, the
candidate must tap into the network of one of the two major parties
in order to have a realistic chance at winning.

380. See id. at 13. For an opinion discussing the relationship between the importance of
partisan “cue” for black minorities in nonpartisan elections, see LaRoque v. Holder, 831
F. Supp. 2d 183 (2011), reversed in part, vacated in part, 679 F.3d 905 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
381. Act of Oct. 10, 2002, ch. 158, § 1, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 615, 622 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.69 (2014)) (providing for the judicial voter guide).
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. See supra notes 352–56 and accompanying text.
386. Brian P. Troutman, Party Over? The Politics of North Carolina’s “Nonpartisan”
Judicial Elections, 86 N. C. L. REV. 1762, 1786 (2008).
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Nevertheless, in my experience, the partisan polarization that
party identification brings is not as extreme as when the partisanship
is indicated on the ballot. Similarly, neither is the racial polarization
that partisanship can bring in heavily black or white areas of the state.
On a positive note, the experience of an open primary system where
all voters participate in nominating and electing candidates can serve
as a model to reduce the adverse effects of partisan polarization in
elections.
CONCLUSION
For the past thirty years, North Carolina has been a laboratory
for a number of electoral experiments to improve our democracy,
including the elimination of at-large elections, nonpartisan district
election of judges, and voter guides for judicial candidates. In terms of
judicial independence, the JRCA is on balance a successful
experiment. While it did not meet all the goals of its proponents, it
had sufficient benefits to highlight the need for reform of our judicial
elections.
North Carolina has historically provided a constitutional
structure that has ensured general judicial independence. Terms are
for eight years, salary and jurisdiction are secured according to the
constitution, and as a result, there is institutional judicial
independence. Election of judges, however, is always problematic
because elections introduce accountability to a constituency whose
popular will is subject to change. A judge’s duty, once elected, is to
apply the law fairly. These two forces—democratic accountability and
judicial responsibility—create a conflict, and thus, a double bind for a
judge seeking office.
Nevertheless, the history of North Carolina shows that relative
judicial independence has been secured for most of its judiciary—first
through legislative election of judges who served “during good
behavior,” and later through democratic, one-party political
domination. Since political competition began in the 1960s, the
professional bar organizations pressed first for merit selection and
later for publicly financed campaigns or appointment schemes that
eliminate elections. The energy behind these organizations is to
return North Carolina to the archetype of judicial selection—
appointment for good behavior.
It was the failure of the professional bar to convince the general
assembly that an inherent problem exists in any judicial election
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scheme.387 The result of this continued failure was a commitment to
make the best of a bad situation and eliminate the worst features of
an elective system. This led to the JCRA. The JCRA was designed to
achieve two goals: first “to ensure the fairness of democratic elections
in North Carolina,” and second “to protect the constitutional rights of
voters and candidates from the detrimental effects of increasingly
large amounts of money being raised and spent to influence the
outcome of elections.”388
The JCRA fairness goals were achieved in part and elusive in
part. Public funding was utilized by most candidates and equalized
campaign resources among both incumbents and challengers. In 2008,
2010, and 2012, for example, the JCRA moderated wide partisan
swings in election results by ameliorating severe partisan and racially
polarized voting. Furthermore, nonpartisan elections freed both
candidates and political organizations from the prejudices of
organized politics so that crossover voting can more easily occur.
However, roll-off in judicial elections shows that, without party cues,
the electorate does not participate in judicial elections and that,
despite the presence of a voter guide, voters choose not to vote based
on the information the board of elections provides.
Finally, the JCRA has not reduced the potential influence of
money on the elections. The Fairjudges.net campaign and
independent expenditures by various groups in 2012 show that the
national trend of outside money in elections will continue. What
effects this will have on relative judicial independence will depend on
the electorate and its willingness to continue to employ jurists who
are experienced in their positions and whom they have previously
elected.
Reflecting on these conclusions, I conclude that, whatever system
North Carolina selects in which to place qualified people in judicial
office—whether by popular election, legislative election,
gubernatorial appointment, or some other plan—most selectees
perform well and rise to the occasion. The structural independence a
judge enjoys protects him while in office from political pressure.
However the retention of a judge in office after an initial term can be
problematic because it causes a judge to audition for renewal to the
public, interests groups, and others of influence. This auditioning
comes at a price. In my view, retention elections would resolve this

387. The problem is eloquently described by Chief Justice Roberts in his opinion in
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666–67 (2015).
388. Act of Oct. 10, 2002, ch. 158, pmbl., 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 215, 616.
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tension and provide an incentive for judges to audition in a manner
that would further ensure judicial independence.
The best alternative would be to return to the Founders’ view
that once appointed, a judge would serve for a term of good behavior.
This alternative would be the only plan that would fit the archetype of
judicial behavior, and it is one that is used throughout the world.
POSTSCRIPT
In the election of 2014, I announced as a candidate for the
Supreme Court of North Carolina and was opposed by sitting court of
appeals Judge Sam J. Ervin, IV.389 Prior to the election, I was
appointed to the supreme court by Governor McCrory, and I took
office on September 6, 2014.390
Elections were held for four seats on the Supreme Court of
North Carolina and four seats on the court of appeals.391 An at-large
election was held for one of those court of appeals seats after Chief
Justice John Martin retired in August 2014.392 The Martin seat on the
court of appeals drew nineteen contestants.393
The annual salary (exclusive of retirement benefits) as a firstterm supreme court justice in 2014 was $139,896 per year for the first
five years of the term, then $146,611 for the last three years of the
term.394 The annual salary as a first-term court of appeals judge was
$134,109 per year for the first five years of the term, then $140,546 for
the last three years of the term.395 The present value of these jobs,
then, was $1,074,372.16 per term for a supreme court justice and
$1,029,928.50 per term for a court of appeals judge.396 The following
chart compares the amount spent by the candidates campaigning for
these offices in 2014 to obtain the right to earn these salaries.

389. 2014 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS, supra note 372.
390. Justice Robert N. Hunter, Jr. To Be Installed as 95th Associate Justice of Supreme
Court on Friday, N.C. CT. SYS. (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.nccourts.org/News/NewsDetail
.asp?id=1466&type=1&archive=False.
391. 2014 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS, supra note 372.
392. Ann Blythe, A Whopping 19 Candidates Vying for One NC Court of Appeals Seat,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Oct. 18, 2014), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local
/crime/article9203663.html.
393. 2014 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS, supra note 372.
394. HUMAN RES. DIV., N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, JUDICIAL OFFICIAL
SALARIES INCLUDING LONGEVITY PAY EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2014 (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
395. Id.
396. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-47 (2014) (providing the calculation for present cash
value of annuities).
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Table 4. Total Expenditures per Candidate in 2014397
Chief Justice (Parker)
Mark Martin
Ola M. Lewis

$655,125.22398
$212,964.84399

Associate Justice (Martin)
Bob Hunter
$404,211.07400
Sam J. Ervin, IV
$664,957.59401
Associate Justice (Hudson)
Eric Levinson
$566,775.76402
Robin Hudson
$733,403.94403
Jeannette Doran
$11,690.23404
Associate Justice (Beasley)
Mike Robinson
$395,586.82405
Cheri Beasley
$347,918.02406

*

*

*

*

397. “*” denotes winning candidate.
398. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
MARTIN FOR CHIEF JUSTICE, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt_search_org
/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132391&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
399. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
COMMITTEE TO ELECT JUDGE OLA M. LEWIS SUPREME COURT, available at
http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt_search_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132279&TP
=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
400. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
BOB HUNTER FOR JUSTICE, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt_search_org
/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132421&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
401. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
ERVIN FOR SUPREME COURT, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt_search
_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132443&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
402. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
LEVINSON COMMITTEE, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt_search_org/cf
_report_detail.aspx?RID=132212&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
403. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
RE-ELECT JUSTICE HUDSON, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt_search_org
/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132464&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
404. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
JEANETTE DORAN FOR JUSTICE, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt_search
_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132743&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
405. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
MICHAEL ROBINSON FOR NC SUPREME COURT, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov
/webapps/cf_rpt_search_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132101&TP=SUM (last visited
Aug. 17, 2015).
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N.C. Court of Appeals Judge (Hunter)
Bill Southern
$49,278.50407
Lucy Inman
$401,615.40408

*

N.C. Court of Appeals Judge (Stroud)
Donna Stroud
$8,536.41409

*

N.C. Court of Appeals Judge (Davis)
Mark Davis
$394,820.22410
Paul Holcombe
$53,450.89411

1887

*

406. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
JUSTICE CHERI BEASLEY COMMITTEE, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt
_search_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132247&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
407. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
COMMITTEE TO ELECT JUDGE BILL SOUTHERN, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov
/webapps/cf_rpt_search_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=131849&TP=SUM (last visited
Aug. 17, 2015).
408. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
COMMITTEE TO ELECT JUDGE LUCY INMAN, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf
_rpt_search_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132403&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17,
2015).
409. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
COMMITTEE TO RE-ELECT JUDGE STROUD, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf
_rpt_search_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132102&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17,
2015).
410. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
JUDGE MARK DAVIS COMMITTEE, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt
_search_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=133247&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
411. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
FRIENDS OF JUDGE PAUL HOLCOMBE, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt
_search_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132268&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
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N.C. Court of Appeals Judge (Martin)
John M. Tyson
$75,723.58412
John S. Arrowood
$129,489.80413
Marty Martin
$13,056.01414
Marion Warren
$11,130.49415
Hunter Murphy
$63,423.76416
Elizabeth D. Scott
$42,420.02417
Ann Kirby
$4,776.00418
Chuck Winfree
$14,447.87419
Daniel Donhue
Unclear
Valerie Zachary
$10,212.64420
Tricia Shields
$57,630.43421
Keischa Lovelace
Unclear
Jody Newsome
$5,287.03422

[Vol. 93

*

412. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
TYSON FOR COURT COMMITTEE, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt_search
_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132189&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
413. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
THE JUDGE ARROWOOD COMMITTEE, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt
_search_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132870&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
414. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
ELECT MARTY MARTIN JUDGE, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt_search
_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132335&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
415. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
COMMITTEE TO ELECT MARION WARREN FOR JUDGE, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov
/webapps/cf_rpt_search_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132110&TP=SUM (last visited
Aug. 17, 2015).
416. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
HUNTER MURPHY FOR JUDGE, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt_search
_org/cf_report_detail.?RID=131988&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
417. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
COMMITTEE TO ELECT ELIZABETH SCOTT, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf
_rpt_search_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132572&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17,
2015).
418. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
KIRBY FOR COURT OF APPEALS, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt_search
_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=131724&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
419. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
COMMITTEE TO ELECT WINFREE, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt_search
_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=133007&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
420. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
COMMITTEE TO ELECT VALERIE JOHNSON ZACHARY TO NC COURT OF APPEALS,
available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt_search_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID
=132078&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
421. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
ELECT TRICIA SHIELDS COMMITTEE, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt
_search_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132446&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
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Jeffrey M. Cook
Lori G. Christian
Betsy Bunting
J. Brad Donovan
Abe Jones
Sabra Jean Faires

1889

$1,331.00423
$22,957.17424
Unclear
$17,714.75425
$22,873.01426
$62,854.00427

These figures do not include money spent by independent
expenditure committees. Although figures for independent
expenditure committees are difficult to verify, press reports and
independent expenditure media filings report that an estimated
$1,300,000 was spent on the elections for the Supreme Court of North
Carolina.428 If so, the total sum of expenditures for many appellate
seats approximately equaled or exceeded the present value of the jobs
sought. Does this system make economic sense? Could not the funds
donated to candidates and the independent expenditure committee
funds be more beneficially spent on elections in the “political”
branches of government in which political and budgetary policies are
made?

422. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
NEWSOME FOR COURT OF APPEALS, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt
_search_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132337&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
423. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
COMMITTEE TO ELECT JEFFREY M. COOK, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf
_rpt_search_org/cf_report_doc_results.aspx?ID=STA-918WXZ-C-001&OGID=29080
(last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
424. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
ELECT JUDGE LORI CHRISTIAN, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt_search
_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132096&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
425. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
DONOVAN FOR COURT OF APPEALS, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt
_search_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132336&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
426. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
COMMITTEE TO ELECT JUDGE ABE JONES, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf
_rpt_search_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132241&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17,
2015).
427. N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE REPORT,
SABRA JEAN FAIRES COMMITTEE, available at http://app.ncsbe.gov/webapps/cf_rpt
_search_org/cf_report_detail.aspx?RID=132185&TP=SUM (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
428. See Chris Kromm, ‘Banjo Ad’ Player is Back, Hawking a Different NC Court
Candidate, INST. FOR S. STUD. (Oct. 29, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.southernstudies.org
/2014/10/banjo-ad-player-is-back-hawking-a-different-nc-cou.html (“In addition to the
money raised directly by candidates, more than $1.3 million has been spent by outside
grounds on the N.C. Supreme Court contests, with more expected in the final days before
the campaign.”).
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The chief difference I have noted between the public financing
systems and the privately financed systems is the time candidates
must spend raising funds. Had the publicly financed system been in
place for the 2014 elections, all candidates for the supreme court
would have qualified for support and most of the candidates for the
court of appeals would have qualified for public support.429 Most
importantly, there would have been an equality of resources for
candidate expenditures, excluding the funds expended by
independent campaigns. Under the former system, the entitlement to
funds would have occurred five days after a candidate wins the
primary in May. Because a candidate would have access to funds as
early as May, the campaigning would have taken place without regard
to fundraisers in which the judicial candidates were competing against
each other and other candidates for limited resources.430
I only cite these figures to suggest that the economics of
contesting judicial offices are askew and that the return on investment
for the public is problematic. Put differently, when the cost of
obtaining office is greater than the benefits that accrue to the person
should that person win, then the decision to run is not economic or
rational. When a rational economic actor is contemplating raising the
amounts of money seen as necessary to win an election, the return on
investment of time and money compared with that of private practice
is impractical. Comparing my thoughts about running for office and
the economics of such a venture, it does not seem a wise investment
for a state to have elections, other than to have a commitment to
social democracy.
When compared with the former public financing statutes, it is
clear that the amount of money to be raised by a judge is more in
proportion to the values he received and does not, during the election
period, require him to focus his efforts completely on fundraising, as
does the private funding system. Furthermore, the costs to the other
“political” branches, which are also fundraising at the same time, is
the diversion of resources that could otherwise be utilized by their
campaigns.
In 2015, the general assembly passed a bill providing for
retention elections for Supreme Court of North Carolina Justices who

429. See Act of Oct. 10, 2002, ch. 158, § 1, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 615, 617 (repealed
2013) (describing the requirements for qualifying for public support under the JCRA).
430. Id.
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were previously elected by popular vote.431 The bill dictates that the
question on the ballot will be “for” or “against” the retention of the
particular justice.432 If the voters approve the retention, the justice is
retained for another eight-year term.433 If the voters fail to approve
the retention, then the seat is deemed vacant and is filled as provided
by law.434 Retention elections will enhance both structural and
relative independence by removing the financial calculations from the
judicial process while still allowing public oversight and accountability
for judicial decision makers.

431. See Act of June 11, 2015, ch. 66, § 1, 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws __, (to be codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-4.1 to 7A-4.2), available at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2015
/Bills/House/PDF/H222v6.pdf.
432. Id.
433. Id. at § 1–2 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT §§ 7A-4.2, -10(a)).
434. Id.
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